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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Basic Problem 
Legal commercial-bank reserve requirements have an important influ­
ence upon the size of the money stock and the ability of the central bank 
to control it. 
Most of the commercial banks in the United States must satisfy legal 
reserve requirements. For state chartered banks which are not members of 
the Federal Reserve System, reserve requirements are set by agencies of 
the state governments. Commercial banks which are members of the Federal 
Reserve System (regardless of whether they are chartered by the federal 
government or by state governments) must satisfy legal reserve require­
ments which are set by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem. The Board's rules concerning member bank reserve requirements are 
known as "Regulation D." 
In September, 1968, the Board radically changed Regulation D. Before 
that date, the Federal Reserve's reserve-requirement system involved "con­
temporaneous reserve accounting." After September, 1968, "lagged reserve 
accounting" was in effect. 
Under contemporaneous reserve accounting (CRA), the average reserves 
which a bank must hold during any particular week are a function of its 
average deposit liabilities during that same week. Under lagged reserve 
accounting (LRA), the average reserves which a bank must hold during the 
week are a function of its average deposit liabilities during the week 
before last. Furthermore, under CRA, "legal" reserves consisted of cur­
rent holdings of vault cash (i.e., currency and coin) and current deposit 
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balances with a Federal Reserve Bank. Under LRA, legal reserves consist 
of current deposit balances with a Federal Reserve Bank and vault cash 
held two weeks earlier. Hence, current holdings of vault cash do not 
meet the criteria of "legal reserves" under LRA. 
The practical problems which led the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System to vote for the 1968 revision can be explained with a de­
scription of member banks which were operating under CRA. 
Under CRA, the reserve settlement week ended on Wednesday morning. 
Therefore, on Tuesday, member banks were at the peak of their efforts to 
achieve their required reserve balances. When this could not be fulfilled 
by routine deposit of reserve balances, banks had to search for ways to 
vary their loans and investments to the nonbank-public. This was done in 
order to contract or expand deposit liabilities in response to shortages 
or surpluses of reserves from required amounts. Of course, policy actions 
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and currency hold­
ings by the nonbank-public can and will affect the deposit and reserve 
situation of the banks. However, these effects are not under the banks' 
control. Other bank transactions such as selling or buying secondary re­
serves, issuing or buying certificates of deposits, and other similar ac­
tions, are useless in terms of changing the amount of reserves in the bank­
ing system, as long as currency in the hands of the nonbank-public is un­
affected. And moreover, there exists a general reluctance for the banks 
to borrow from the Federal Reserve Banks' discount windows. All of these 
elements reinforce the idea that the ability of the banking system to es­
cape the shortages or surpluses of reserves on Wednesdays, rested on its 
ability to contract or expand its deposit liabilities by changing loans 
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and investments to the nonbank-public. The problem was obvious. Tuesdays 
of every week turned out to be days with (1) high fluctuations in interest 
rates, (2) intensive defensive operations by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System for the purpose of stabilizing its monetary policy 
target variables, and (3) great uncertainty for banks. 
The purpose of the 1968 revision was to decrease the amount of uncer­
tainty which banks were encountering, by giving them enough time to adjust 
their required reserves. The expectation was that the fluctuation of in­
terest rates would be smoothed out and the transaction of the reserves 
would be less concentrated on one single day. 
Since 1968, there have been many studies that have criticized the new 
system on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Coats (12), Burger (8), 
Pierce (31), Gilbert (19) and Laurent (27) can be cited. 
The main theoretical weakness of the new system, agreed upon by most 
of the studies, lies in the absence of a link between current required re­
serves and current deposits. This problem causes destruction of the feed­
back mechanism of changes going from the current reserves situation due to 
the policy action of the Federal Reserve (i.e., change in total or unbor­
rowed reserves) to current required reserves via changes in current depos­
its. Hence, no limit or level of consequent change in deposits can be 
estimated. 
The other criticism of the system concerns the banks' behavior. The 
absence of immediate worry for their required reserves under this system 
would encourage banks to have very large amounts of deposit liabilities 
due to large loans and investments made to the nonbank-public. The prob­
lem, then, is that after two weeks, the banks must worry about acquiring a 
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large amount of required reserves, due to large accumulations of deposits 
from the previous two weeks. Banks cannot travel backwards in time to de­
crease those deposits. Individual banks, then, intensively desire new re­
serves, which are difficult to acquire for the banking system as a whole. 
Eventually, for the purpose of preventing reserve deficiency. Federal Re­
serve Banks will let banks use their discount windows, which causes the 
Federal Reserve authorities to depart from their target and pursue a poli­
cy which may not follow their target path. Moreover, intensive demand for 
reserves, which has been created by this problem, could push interest rates 
higher. This might be another reason for the more active Federal Reserve 
defensive policy action under LRA. 
As a result, the banks might follow a very conservative policy in ac­
quiring deposits for the following two weeks. In turn, it would create a 
problem in reverse, which would result after four weeks in a reserve sur­
plus, intensive downward push of interest rates, and again an intensive 
Federal Reserve defensive operation. Therefore, adoption of this new sys­
tem would introduce a two week period of fluctuations in interest rates 
and money market variables, less control on deposit creation, and more 
problems in pursuing the monetary policies by the Federal Reserve. 
Empirical research results support the intensity of the mentioned 
problems under LRA; see Coats (12) and Burger (8). 
Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this study are twofold. The first is to build a 
model which includes the system of LRA in the mechanism by which Federal 
Reserve actions are transmitted to financial markets based on different 
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behavioral assumptions for both the banking system and the Federal Reserve 
System. In the process of developing the analysis, it will be shown how 
heavily the banking system relies on its past behavior as a consequence of 
the inclusion of lagged accounting. 
Secondly, under a certain set of behavioral, economical and statis­
tical assumptions, the impact of the Federal Reserve Banks' policy action 
on the banking deposit will be examined and estimated. The key variables, 
such as interest rates and bank deposits, will be forecasted. 
Outline of the Study 
In Chapter II, some of the related literature on the system of lagged 
reserves accounting and short-term banking behavior will be reviewed. 
Chapter III consists of four parts. Abbreviations of commonly used 
variables are presented in part one. In part two, a summary of the study 
by Modigliani, Rasche and Cooper (30) is presented. The system of lagged 
reserve accounting is included in the model, and the deposit supply func­
tion is derived. In part three, the model is modified by adding certifi­
cates of deposits and Eurodollar borrowings to the banking behavioral func­
tions. The modified version of deposit supply function is developed. In 
part four, "Federal fund rate" is used as an instrumental variable. Re­
purchase agreement activities are considered in banks' behavioral adjust­
ments, and new supply relations are derived. 
In Chapter IV, statistical problems such as seasonal variations and 
serial correlations are described in part one. Parts two, three and four 
present the results of fitting deposit supply functions with ordinary-
least-square and with the simultaneous equations technique of 
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two-stage-least-squares. In Part V, the ability of Model I under LRA to 
generate the historical values of interest rate and deposit supply, for 
the period of July, 1975, to June, 1976, is tested. 
Chapter V consists of summary and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II. A REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
There are a few studies on the subject of lagged reserves accounting. 
The practical problems represented in Chapter One are agreed upon by most 
of the studies. For example, Laurent (27) concludes that the problems of 
high management cost for individual banks, more viability of interest 
rates and deposits, and the difficulties of conducting monetary policy by 
the Federal Reserve authorities are worsened under the lagged accounting 
system. Gilbert (19), Laufenberg (26), Coats (12) and Pierce (31) also 
reach the same conclusions. 
To solve the problems of the new system, Laurent (27, pp. 18-20) pro­
poses a system in which the direction of the lag between deposits and re­
quired reserves is reversed. Under the proposed system, the Federal Re­
serve authorities would set the amount of reserves during the current week, 
and the level of required reserves would be determined by the deposit crea­
tion of the banks two weeks later. 
Pierce (31) suggests the use of the marginal reserves as opposed to 
the total reserves as policy control variables. In addition to that, he 
substitutes what he calls "required contemporaneous reserves" for required 
reserves under the lagged accounting system. "Required contemporaneous 
reserves" could be satisfied with the deposited reserves of the banks at 
the Federal Reserve Banks at the current week plus the vault cash of the 
banks in the current week. 
All of the studies mentioned above have some kind of implicit behav­
ioral assumptions for both the individual banks and the banking system. 
Among these studies. Coats (12) and Laufenberg (26) explicitly devise the 
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behavioral assumptions for the banking system, but still the individual 
banks' behavioral assumptions are implicit in their studies. 
Laufenberg (26) in his study formulates the behavioral assumptions 
for the banking system as: 
1) Equilibrium condition: FR^ = FR^ 
2) + yDj 
where 
FR^ = Free reserves in the banking system; 
FR^ = Desired level of free reserves in the banking system; 
i^ = Federal funds interest rate; 
i . = Federal Reserve discount rate; 
°t 
T = Constant term; 
= Demand deposit of the member banks. 
Furthermore, i can be considered as the opportunity cost of holding 
excess reserves and alternative cost to the cost of borrowing from the 
Federal Reserve Banks (FRB). Therefore, an increase (decrease) in i would 
induce the banks to hold less (more) excess reserves and, hence, less 
sppd (more) free reserves. Which means; • < 0. On the other hand, the 0 1 
higher (lower) the FRB's discount rate "ceteris paribus," the smaller 
(larger) the bank's desire to borrow from the FRB. Therefore, the larger 
apod (smaller) free reserve is desired by the banks. Or; > 0. It is 
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3 FR^ also assumed that: = Y>0. The higher (lower) the deposit level 
will induce banks desire to hold more (less) free reserves. 
Whenever there is a gap between the actual and the desired levels of 
the free reserves, there will be incentive for the banks to close the gap. 
Specifically, if the banks' actual free reserves increase due to policy 
action by the Federal Reserve authorities, the banks will be encouraged 
to make more loans and investments to the nonbank-public and to create 
more deposits. Under contemporaneous reserve accounting, as a result of the 
above actions, the banks' required reserves will increase and absorb the 
reserves from the actual free reserves. Hence, the level of actual free 
reserves will decrease and close the disequilibrium gap. 
Under the lagged reserve accounting, the larger deposits of the banks 
will not affect the current level of the required reserves, so there will 
be no mechanism by which the required reserves absorb the extra free re­
serves created by the policy actions. 
In his second behavioral assumption, for the purpose of solving this 
problem, Laufenberg assumes the desired level of free reserves will get 
larger as the amounts of the deposits increase. The banks' reactions will 
restore the equilibrium, not by decreasing the actual level of the free 
reserves, but by increasing their desired level. Variations in both rates 
i and i^ help to close the disequilibrium gap faster by affecting the de­
sired level of the free reserves, and the burden on these rates for clos­
ing the disequilibrium gap is higher under the lagged accounting system. 
Based on his assumption, Laufenberg derives deposit supply functions 
under both the lagged and the contemporaneous accounting systems. He 
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discusses the effects of changes in the policy variables under both sys­
tems. He found stable, continuous and dynamic paths for the interest 
rate and the level of the deposit to their new equilibriums as a result 
of the adjustment for the changes in the policy variables under the con­
temporaneous accounting system. Further, he found an oscillating dynamic 
path for the variables under lagged reserve accounting. His analysis can 
be extended to a case in which the stability of the system depends upon 
certain conditions imposed on the elasticities of the supply and demand 
curves for deposits. 
As mentioned before, in all of these studies, a complete and explicit 
set of behavioral assumptions at the micro-level (the individual bank), 
and at the macro-level (the banking system) is absent. 
The literature in short-run banking behavior can be classified into 
two parts. The first approach imposes behavioral equations based on a 
combination of environmental factors affecting banks. The applications of 
the familiar stock-adjustment models are heavily used in this approach. 
The studies by Fraser and Rose (16), Bryan and Carleton (6) and the studies 
by Coats (12) and Laufenberg (26) (even though they do not talk about the 
stock-adjustment models) can be mentioned. 
For example, Bryan and Carleton (6), as their first hypothesis for 
the individual banks' short-term behavior, impose the following relation­
ships: 
E t (1) 
(2)  
11 
where: r 
R = An of the nonearning assets - required reserves; 
R^* = The desired level of R^; 
D = Demand deposits; 
r = A measure for either Treasury bill rate, or marginal rate 
on investment, or Federal fund interest rate; 
B = A measure for either outstanding borrowings, or cost of 
borrowings, or borrowed reserves; 
L = Loan demand; 
S = Bank's size; 
£•(• = The disturbance term; 
M = Deposit mix = • 
Then they test the hypothesis with different combinations of variables 
and measures for r and B. They use a similar approach for their second 
hypothesis. 
In the second approach, the analytical apparatus and structure of 
the system develops in a framework which is based on well-known behavioral 
assumptions such as profit maximization, utility maximization, or cost 
minimization, with or without some kind of constraints. 
Studies by Modigliani, Rasche and Cooper (30), Hester and Pierce (22) 
and Wood (38, pp. 1-63) assume banks are profit maximizers. Aigner (1), 
and Aigner and Bryan (2), use the utility maximizing criterion for the 
banks. Boltersperger and Hellmuth (4) assume banks are cost minimizers, 
and Depamphilis (13) uses liquidity constrained cost minimizing criterion 
for the banks. 
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Among the above studies, Modigliani, Rasche and Cooper (30) describe 
the banking behavior in both the individual bank and the banking system 
scale, in its broadest and best form. The analyses presented in the fol­
lowing chapters will heavily concentrate on the model by Modigliani, 
Rasche and Cooper (30). 
In the subject of the relationships between the Federal Reserves 
System and the banking system, most studies have assumed some kind of 
aggregate reserves as the control or instrumental variables which are 
used by the Federal Reserves authorities. 
During the period from 1970 to 1976, which is the period used for 
the empirical estimations in Chapter IV of this study, the Federal Re­
serve authorities used the Federal fund interest rate as their instrumen­
tal variable for the purpose of achieving the desired path of the money 
supply. The study by Kopecky (25) takes this fact into account. Model 3 
in Chapter III will discuss this point. 
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL MODELS OF MONEY SUPPLY 
DETERMINATION UNDER LAGGED RESERVE 
ACCOUNTING 
Part I. Abbreviations 
CRA = Contemporaneous Reserve Accounting 
LRA = Lagged Reserve Accounting 
FRB = Federal Reserve Banks 
FFM = Federal Fund Market 
FFR = Federal Fund Market Interest Rate 
FOC = First Order Condition 
SOC = Second Order Condition 
GNP = Gross National Product 
Fed = Federal Reserve Authorities 
RP = Repurchase Agreement 
RV = Reverse Repurchase Agreement 
CD = Large-Negotiable Certificates of Deposit 
OMO = Open Market Operation 
FOMC = Federal Open Market Committee 
USGS = The United States Government Securities 
EURO = Eurodollar 
FDIC = Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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Part II. Model I 
Summary of Modigliani, Rasche, and Cooper's Model (Model I under contem­
poraneous reserve accounting) 
Assumptions 
1. The supply of the currency component of money supply is demand deter­
mined so the paper concentrates on determinants of the stock of the 
demand deposit component of money supply. 
2. Only member banks are analyzed. 
3. In the short-run, the rise in commercial loan supply is demand deter­
mined. Banks accommodate the increase in the demand for commercial 
loans because commercial loan customers are the sources of deposits 
and other banking businesses. 
Using the system of CRA, an individual bank's balance sheet is shown 
below. 
Representative Bank's Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Reserves Total R Demand Deposits D 
Required RR Federal Government D^ 
against demand 6D All Others D 
deposit P 
against time tT Time Deposits T 
deposit 
Surplus (excess re- S Borrowing (from FRB B* 
serve + loans inFFM) and FFM) 
Commercial Loans CL Miscellaneous Liabilities CA+MA 
and Capital 
Other Investments I 
Miscellaneous Assets MA 
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Tne bank is visualized as holding anticipations as to the level of 
D, T, and CL which will prevail over the coming decision period. Assum­
ing errors in anticipations, the variables D, T, and CL are randon vari­
ables subject to a known subjective probability distribution. Each vari­
able Z is a sum of two components, a mathematical expectation Z and a 
random part where Z = D,T,CL. 
Z = Z + X;. (1} 
From the balance sheet of the representative bank, the following identi­
ties are derived. 
PR = S-B* 
( 2 )  
FR = D+T-RR-CL-I+CA 
Under CRA: RK = ôD+tT 
6 = Required reserves ratio against D 
T = Required reserves ratio against T. 
Given constant CA, for any chosen I, the outcome of FR depends upon 
the realization of the three random variables D, T, and CL. Hence, FR it­
self would be a random variable. So, from U) and (2): 
FR = FR+Xpj^ 13) 
FR = D(l-<S)+T(l-T)-cr-l+CA (4) 
X = Xq( 1-<S)+Xj( 1-T. (5) 
4lX) IS defined as tne probability density function of X which 1s a 
function of the joint probability density distribution of tne variables 
a» O/ 
Xq, Xy, X^^. further, it is equal to the probability density function of 
h 
FR. $(x) is defined as the cumulative probability distribution function of 
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X, which is equal to the cumulative probability distribution function 
of FR. 
From equation (4), given ÏÏ, T, and CL, the anticipated level of the 
free reserves FR will be controlled by the decision variable I. Any opti­
mum level of I will optimize FR. For a representative bank J, (J is used 
as a subscript for variables) it is true that 
which is equal to the small change in FRj due to small change of Ij.i 
Bank J tries to maximize its expected return from its portfolio. It is 
not holding surplus reserves and borrowing reserves at the same time. 
Therefore, borrowing can be identified by -FRj and surplus reserves by 
Bank J's expected return (expected profit) can be written as follows: 
i = Rate of return on I 
r^ = Rate of return on holding surplus 
r = Rate of cost on borrowed funds 
Kj = A component of profit which is independent of portfolio 
decision 
Pj = Expected return or expected profit. 
^This is true under the assumption that bank J is a small component of 
the banking system. Bank J does not anticipate its sales or acquisitions 
of assets to affect its deposits significantly. 
dFR 
+FRj. 
-FR 
where r^^ = Rate of return on CL 
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From FOC, for the profit maximization procedure for bank J, the optimum 
values of FR^j and Ij are derived. 
^ ^ (%) 
Ij = DJ(1-6)+TJ(1-T)-CLj+CAj+»-1 (8) 
where 
FRj = The optimum level for the mathematical expectations of FR 
for bank J; 
• 
IJ = The optimum level for bank J's investment portfolio. 
Assuming all banks face the same interest rates and the same reserves 
requirement ratios, the optimum level of the aggregate FR and the aggre-
* * 
gate I for the banking system is the summation of FRj and Ij, respectively, 
over all bank J's. Therefore, the aggregate of FR^ and the aggregate of 
* 
Ij at time t, in the banking system is written as follows: 
* _ 
= D^(1-6)+T^(1-T)-CL^+CA^-FR^ , (10) 
assuming the functional form i|> exhibits the same properties as $~j . 
Additional assumptions are made for the purpose of generalizing the 
equations (9) and (10) in order to explain the reality better. 
1) The investment decision is responsive to the errors in the antici­
pation of the levels of the portfolios D, T, and CL, at the beginning 
of the period, in addition to being responsive to the anticipation of the 
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mentioned variables. This response may not be perfect. So the term 
is added as an explanatory variable to the investment decision 
equations where Z = 0, T, CL, and measures the degree of the investment 
response to the error in the anticipation of variable Z. 
2) adjusts to its optimum anticipated level in the next period 
FR^, not necessarily instantaneously, so the term FR^ in equation (10) can 
be replaced by the term np(FR^-FR^ ^)+FR^ The new term states that at 
time t, the only np portion of the difference (FR^-FR^ is added to 
FR^_1. The equality of (np=l) states that FR^^^ fully adjusts to its op­
timum anticipated level in the next period FR^, at time t. Therefore, 
np measures the speed of adjustment of FR^_^ to its optimum anticipated 
level in the next period FR^. 
3) Banks anticipate the levels of their portfolios based on the past 
values of them. They are able to forecast the changes from the past 
values to the current values with some degree of accuracy. So Z^ is 
estimated by the term ^•t_i"^'2(^t~^t-l^ where the term m' ^ measures the 
degree of accuracy in anticipating the level of Z^. 
Based on the above assumption, the change in the level of the in­
vestment portfolio at time t is estimated, 
A l t  =  n p ( l - 6 ) A D ^ + n ^ ( l - T ) A T ^ - n ^ , ^ A C L t + A C A ^ - n p ( F ^ - F R ^ _ j )  ( 1 1 )  
where 
n^ = l-(l-m2)(l-m^), Z = D, T, and CL. 
Under assumptions for aggregation, the balance sheet for the representa­
tive bank J is used for the banking system. The items in bank J's balance 
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sheet are redefined for their aggregate levels. Therefore, equation (2) 
is also used for the banking system. Assuming the variables and CL^ 
as exogenous to the system^ and variable CA^ constant, using equations 
(2) and (11), the change in the supply of deposit for the banking system 
at time t is estimated. 
1 
" {l-np)+6np AUR+(l-n(,|_)ACL^ 
-(l-nj+Tn-[.)AT^-np(FR^-FR^_^) ( 1 2 )  
The rate of cost of the borrowed funds r is approximated by FFR and 
is determined by supply and demand for funds in FFM which is expressed as: 
r^ = R(d^, FR^) (13) 
where 
d = FRB's discount rate. 
From equation (9), the optimum anticipated level of FR is shown as 
FR! = -^(l+ t r-r 
Assuming (r-r^) is relatively constant, then FR is rewritten as 
FR^ = F(i, r) . (14) 
From equations (12), (13), and (14), FR^ is derived. 
^At least for the purpose of short-term behavior of the banking 
system. 
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FRt = rF 
1-6  
i,R(d,FR^) + (l-r)FRt_i + (l-Hn) 
5 -^UR^ - (l-n(,^_}ACL^+nyAT^ 
where 
(15) 
(l-np)+ônp 
Dj (l~nj)+T(rij-riQ)- ^(l-riQ). 
The functional form F is linearly approximated. 
FR t = ao+aii+a2d+a3(l-r)FRt_i+a3-
(l-ncL)ACLt+ntATt ( 1 6 )  
The decision period might be considered as one week, but quarterly 
data are used so the time dimension must be changed. Assuming m decision 
periods in each quarter^ then equation (16) might be rewritten as 
FR(t) 
m 
Z 
J=1 
a^tl-r) 
m-j 
a2d(t,j) 
,aQ+aji(t,j) + 
( l -np)  ^  AUR(t , j )  
(l-n^^)ACL(t,j)+nyAT(t,j) 
agfl-r) 
m 
where 
. FR(t-l) 
FR(t) = FR at the end of the period t 
FR(t-l) = FR at the end of the period t-1, 
or at the beginning of the period t 
(17) 
^m might be equal to thirteen. 
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Z(t,j) = value of the variable Z at decision period j 
at quarter t. 
t has been redefined in terms of a period of one quarter. Assuming values 
of i and d are constant over decision period j and AZ{t,j) = , which 
m 
L means the value of AZ at decision period j at quarter t is -th of the 
value of AZ at quarter t, then equation (17) is rewritten as: 
FR. = 
m 
z j=l a^Cl-r) 
m-j 
"0 + 
m 
I  j=l a^fl-r) 
m-j 
^l^t 
m 
+ E 
3=1 
a3(l-r) 
m-j 
^Z^t* np \ 
m 
j=l ag(l-r) 
m-j 
AU^t • n^ 
m 
I  j = l aad-r) 
m-j a^ * m 
ACL. + n, «m "Z 
^ "f ' j=l aad-r) 
m-j 
ATt + ajd-r) 
m 
FR t-1 • (18) 
Equation (18) is empirically estimated. For the purpose of money 
supply determination, the identity of 
UR.-TT,-FR. 
D = under CRA is utilized. L  0  
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The inclusion of "lagged reserve accounting" (Model I under lagged re­
serve accounting) 
The results presented by Modigliani, Rasche, and Cooper can be al­
tered and modified by inclusion of LRA in the individual bank's behavior­
al functions, the equation of the banking system and the process of money 
supply determination. 
Representative Bank's Balance Sheet 
Assets 
Reserve total 
Required 
against demand 
deposits of two 
periods ago 
against time 
deposits of 
two periods ago 
Surplus (excess re­
serves + loans in 
FFM) 
Commercial loans 
Other Investment 
Miscellaneous Assets 
RR. 
ôD t-2 
TT t-2 
CL, 
MA, 
Liabilities 
Demand Deposits 
Federal Government 
All others 
Time deposits 
Borrowing (from FRB 
and FFM) 
Miscellaneous lia­
bilities and Capital 
CAt+MAt 
t stands for period of one week, 
From the representative bank's balance sheet, the following identities can 
be derived: 
* 
URt E Rt - Bt 
FRt = St - B; = URt-RR; 
(19) 
(20) 
FRt . Dt+Tt-RRt-CLt-It+CAt ( 2 1 )  
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FR^ = Dt-6Dt_2+Tt-TTt_2-CLt-It+CAt ( 2 2 )  
where 
RR^ - ' (23) 
Based on the same assumptions of the portfolios of the representative 
bank as seen in Model I under CRA, it can be written: 
Oi 
Tt -
^'-t " CLt+^CL, 
where D , T., and CL. are the expected values of the variables and 
"t  U  U 
Xp, , X_ , and X^, are the pure random parts with expected values of zero, 
^t t t 
E(Xn ) = E(X. ) = E(Xp, ) = 0. 
^t 't ^""t 
In contrast to CRA, RR^ under LRA is not a random variable and it is de­
rived from the past observations of D and T. Equation (21) can be re­
written as follows: 
= "t ' \ -««t - CLt - XcLt - 't + 
or 
Dt + Tt + CLt - - :t + "t 
Oi a-
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Define: 
Then: 
FRt = Dt + Tt + CL^ - RRj - I, + CA^ (24) 
OI OI OI 'VI 
FR^ = FR^ + (26) 
where FR^ = The expected value for FR^ 
O. 
= Pure random part of FR^ with the expected value of zero 
E(X^) = 0. 
Define: 
Oi g{X^) = The probability density function of X^ (or of FR) for 
the representative bank. 
G(X^) = The cumulative probability distribution function of X^ 
(or of FR) for the representative bank. 
The representative bank J (J is used as a subscript for the variables) 
has known anticipations for T, , D, , and CL, . The value of RR, is 
""t t t t 
known and CA, is assumed to be constant. Under these conditions, from 
t __ 
equation (24), the value of FR-, would be controlled by the decision vari-
t _ 
able I, . Any optimized level of I, would optimize FR-, . Assuming bank 
"^t "^t t 
J is a small component of the banking system, then from equation (24) it 
can be written: 
dFR' 
^ = .1. 
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Assuming that bank J withholds both borrowing and surplus at the same 
time, that demand by the nonbank-public for commercial loans are exogenous 
to bank J's decision process. The expected return then, of representative 
bank J at time t, can be formulated as follows: 
f "  
''jt ~ + r j FRj^g(FRj^)dFRj^ 
00 
where 
+ rsjl FRj^g(FRj^)dFRj^ (27) 
r^^CLj = The expected return on CLj ; 
ill = The expected return on I, 
^t ^t 
f O  
/ PR, a(PR, )dPRi = The expected cost of borrowing (when 
j-" '^t' "^t ^t 
bank J is in a situation of borrowing reserves or having 
a negative PR, ). 
J f + CO PR, g(PR, )dPR, = The expected return of having a sur-0 ^t "^t ^t 
plus (when bank 0 has a surplus of reserves or has a 
positive FRj ). 
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From equation (26) it is shown that: 
0/ 
dX, = dFR, ,  
''t '^t 
and the range for random variable X, is (-FR-. , -«> ), 
"^t t 
Therefore, equation(27) can be rewritten as: 
r'\ ~ _ 
\ \ "-CL^ * * '•J V 
g(X, )dX, + r / (X, + FRj ) . 
t t V_FR ^t 
^t 
g(Xj^) • dXj^ 
The term /.-FRj /  " 4 -0 ,  /\j J . dX. 
will be added and subtracted to the above equation. Thus, 
' (Xj^+FRj 
I -FR ^ (Xj + FRj )g(Xj ) "^t "^t ^t 
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% 
dX 
't iJ\ . V..J +FR ) . g(X ) . dX 
-FR. t t ^ * 
The bracketed term in the above equation can be rewritten in the follow­
ing way: 
+ 
•/ 
Oi a. 
Bracketed term - / (X, +FR, )g(X, )dX, 
"^t t t ""t 
i / 
+ 00 
o» O» 'X' 
+ 00 
FR, • j^9(Xj )'dXj 
^t ^ 
It is also known that: 
= 1. 
a» 
So the bracketed term will be equal to E(X, ) + PR, • 1, 
""t "^t 
Since E(X, ) = 0, the bracketed term is equal to FR, . Moreover, it is 
""t t 
known that 
dG(X, ) = g(X, )dX, . 
Finally, equation (27) can be rewritten as: 
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fj ' K, + rj-^CL, + ilj^ + (r-r^) J' 
-FR, 
* (Xj  + FR )  •  
"'t '^t 
dG(X, ) + r FR, . (28) 
For the profit maximizing procedure, we will differentiate the profit 
function with respect to the decision variable 
9P 
J • — 
a(-FRi ) 
1 imit 
A -1 i 
.-FR, 3(FR, +X, ) 
t t ""t 
9(-FR. ) 
3(-FRj ) 
dG(Xi ) + (FR, - FR, )dG(-FR, ) • —=3-^ 
^t t ""t 9(-FRj ) 
(FR, + A)dG(A) • 
•t 9(-FRT ) 
"^t 
+ r 
3(-FRj ) 
s 91 
where A is an arbitrary variable, 
9FR, 9(-FR, ) 
91, 
=  1 ,  
91 
9(FR, + X, ) 
^ = -1, and 5 ^ = -1. 
9(-FR, ) 
From probability distribution for FR^, it can be written: 
G(- ") = 0 and dG(- <») = 0, or limit dG{A) = 0. 
A - 00 
Therefore, 
Yf— = i-(r-r ) • 1imit 
^ A^-' I A 
.-FR. 
^ dG(Xj ) -r. 
29 
or 
"âT— = i - (r-r ) . limit G(-FÏÏ, ) - G(A) 
Thus, 
9P. 
t = , . (r-r^jGf-FR, ) - (29) 
For FOC: 
so 
dP 
91  
=  0 ,  
or 
i - (r-rg)G(-FRj ) - r^ = 0 
i-r 
Accordingly, the optimum level of FR, for bank J can be written as 
"-"t 
(30) 
G(FR-, ) is a monotonically increasing function. Thus, -G(FR, ) would 
^t t 
be a monotonically decreasing function. As seen above, as i increases, 
_i i-r 
G(-FRj ) would increase, so -Gj^ ( ) would decrease. 
9FR. 
91  < 0. 
Therefore, it follows: 
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For a similar reason 
BFRt 
^ < 0 .  9r 
Therefore, one can write: 
9l, 9FR -1 
- ^ < 0 .  
By substituting the value of PR-, from equation (30) for PR, in equation 
"^t t 
(24), the optimum level of investment decision for bank J under LRA will 
be derived. 
Por SOC of profit maximization, one can write;! 
3G(-FR, ) 9(-"FR, ) 
= - (r-r ) • g(-FR, ). 
s 0^  
iThe comparative static results can also be derived from SOC. 
9pRI  911 9 i  
^t _ ^t 
3G(-PR, ) 9(-PR, ) 
&F- -(r-r ) __ t . _ t 
91, 9FRI ^ 9(-PRI ) 9(FR, ) 
"^t "^t t t 
(Footnote continued on following page). 
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Moreover: 
g(-FRj ) > 0, r > 0, r^ > 0. 
So the condition for the profit maximization would be 
2 9'^P, 
4* 
—5-^ < 0, or -(r-r.) <0, or r > r . 
ar, ^ s 
^t 
(Footnote continued from preceding page). 
We have: 
8G(-FR, ) 9(-FRt ) 
-=A>o, = -1, 
3(-FRi ) 9(FR, ) 
"^t t 
and from SOC - (r-r^) < 0. 
Thus, 
9(FR, ) 
t  < 0 .  
91 
2 Furthermore, 9 P, 
^t 
9FR, 9l, •9r -G(-FR, ) 
. "'t 
" A, '  ' A, 
9l, .gFR. 9l, '9FRi 
"^t ""t ^t ^t 
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On the other hand, G(-FR, ) is a cumulative probability distribution 
""t 
so it must be positive. Therefore, from FOC, it can be stated that 
i-rg 
— > 0, or i > 
In order for the optimum levels of FR, and I, to exist and result in the 
"^t ^t 
maximum level of profit, the following condition must be satisfied: 
i > r > r^. 
Assuming that all banks face the same interest rates in all markets 
and the same required reserve ratios, we can aggregate FR, and I, over 
t t 
all banks. The optimum level of the expected free reserves and the op­
timum level of investment in the system as a whole can be derived as 
follows: 
Therefore, 
+ i-r 
and 
FRt = -Htf?:?;) (32) 
* "o * 0 "o _ "o 
I+, = Z It = ZD, + ZT, - zCL, 
^ J=1 "^t J=1 "^t J=1 "^t J=1 "^t 
"O "O "o 1 i-r 
It follows 
* i-r 
't = Dt + T; - CL, - RR^ 4. CA^ + «t ' (") 
where the H function exhibits the same properties as 
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riQ = the number of the banks in the banking system. 
In a more realistic manner, one can assume the following; 
1) Investment decision responds to the errors in anticipations be-
' sides being responsive to the levels of the anticipations of the 
variables; 
2) Adjustment of the FR to its optimum is slow. Then, under LRA, the 
optimum level of investment decision equation can be rewritten as: 
^ ^t * + My(T^-T^) - CL^ - m^ j^(CL^-CL^) 
+ CA^ - RRj -
- FKt-l) + FRt-1 
where 
m^ ( = mQ, m-p, and m^^) measures the degree of investment respon­
siveness to the errors in anticipation of the variable Z ( = D, T, and CL), 
Assuming that the anticipations of the variable Z can be based on its 
past values, it can then be stated that 
where m^ measures the degree of accuracy in anticipating the level of Z^. 
So: 
Zt + (Z^-Zt) - m^fZ^-Zt) - Z^ 
(l-mz)(Zt-Zt) - Z, = + 
( l-m^) ( l-m^) (Z^-Z^_j^)+Z^_^ - l-fl-m^OCl-m^) 
(Zt-Zt-l'+Zt-l 
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Define 
so 
" "z^V^t-1^ ^t-1' 
so the equation for the optimum investment decision can be rewritten as 
' t  °  * ^t-1 " "CL^CLt-CLt.i)  
- CLt.i + + CA^.i - (RRt-RRt-i) - KRt-1 
or 
* 
' t -
•nplFRt - FR^_^) - FR^_^, 
Ot-i*Tt_i-CLt_i+cAt_i-RRt-i"FRt-i 
npAD^+njAT^-n^l^ACL^+ACA^-ARR^-np(FR^-FR^_j), 
The balance sheet for the representative bank J and identities (21) 
and (23) can be used for the banking system. Therefore, from equation 
(21) it can be stated: 
^t-1 -CL^_i+CA^_i-RR^_i-FR^_i 
and define 
* * 
Al^ = If-It-l' assume aI^ = Al^. 
Therefore, 
Al^ = npAD^+n-j.AT^-n(,|^ACL^+ACA^-ARR^-np(F^-FR^_^). (34) 
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Given ACA^, ARR^, FR^ and assuming that at least in the short-run, 
AT^ and ACL^ are considered to be exogenous variables, then the change in 
the supply of deposit for the banking system at time t, under LRA, can be 
estimated by equations (21) and (34). From equation (21), it is known 
AI^ = AD^+AT^ - ACL^ + ACA^ - ARR^ - AFR^. 
By substituting in equation (34) for Al^, from the above equations, the 
results are 
AD^ = -AT^+ACL^-ACA^+ARR^+AFR^+npAD^+n^AT^-n^^ACL^+ACA^-
ARRt-nF(FRt-FRt_i) 
Thus 
or 
AD. = 
t l-nir AFR^- ( l-n^)AT^+( l-n^^L )ACL^-np(FR^-FR^_j )j (35) 
AD. = t l-nr AUR^-(l-n^jAT^+(l-n^L)ACL^-np(FR^-FR^_ j)-ARR^ 
(36) 
Equation (36) relates the variable AD^ to the policy variable UR^, 
given constant RR^ and FR^^^, exogenous and CL^, and the optimized level 
of FR^(FR^). 
In reality, banks can neither predict the values of the variables 
and adjust for their errors perfectly, nor have they complete inability 
of anticipating and adjusting for the variables. Banks can partially 
anticipate the values of the variables and adjust for the errors in the 
variables; in other words: 0 < np,nj,n^.|_,np < 1. 
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Let's consider the cases in which n^, n^, n^^^ and np take their ex­
treme values. 
Assume n^ = = 1, which means that banks can perfectly forecast the 
values of and CL^ and fully adjust for their forecast errors. More­
over, since and CL^ are exogenous, we should see no effect from AT^ 
and ACL^ on the change in D^. As n^ = n^^^ = 1, then l-n-j- = 1-n^,^ = 0. 
Therefore, the terms AT^ and ACL^ would not appear in the equation for 
the change in D^. Equation (36) can be rewritten as 
1 AD. = 
t l-Pp AUR t-nF{FRt-FRt_i)-ARRt 
Moreover, assume np = 1, or FR adjusts to its desired level instantaneous­
ly; the results are then 
AD - 1 
t l-np AUR t - (FRt-FRt-i'-ARRt 
The above equation states that: given ARR^ based on the deposits of pre­
vious weeks, any change in the policy variable UR^ by the Fed will affect 
AD^ as long as FR^ is different from FR^. 
If FR^ > F^, then the surplus of the free reserves will determine 
the increase in D^, and if FR^ < FR^, the shortage of the free reserves 
will determine the decrease in 
Moreover, consider the case that only n^ = 1, which means the banks 
can perfectly anticipate the level of the demand deposit; they can 
^Note that in the long-run, if we continue to have the surplus of 
the free reserves, D. would continuously increase, and vice versa. Con­
sequently, under LRA, the fact that n,, n-. , or np in reality are not 
equal to one, is very crucial. 
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accurately forecast any errors of the anticipation, and completely remedy 
errors. Thus 
& AUR, ^  - (l-nj)AT^ + (l-n|^^)ACL^-np(FR^-FR^_j) - ARR^ 
The change in the deposit is not defined by the changes of UR^, RR^, FR^, 
or the exogenous variables. The result is not surprising, because is 
perfectly and accurately forecasted. The optimization of any variables 
such as FR^ or the changes of any exogenous variables would not affect 
the full predicted level of D^. In this case, any change in the policy 
variable has neither direct nor indirect effect on the change in the level 
of the deposit.3 
Then, for the other extreme case, assume n^ = n^ = n^^ = 0, which 
means banks are completely unable to forecast and remedy errors in their 
forecasts of the variables D^, T^, CL^. In this case, the model will be 
fully affected by the variations in the exogenous variables T^ and CL^. 
That is shown by equation (36) when n^ = n^ = n^^ = 0. 
AD^ = AUR^-np(FR^-FR^_j^) - ARR^-AT^+ACL^ 
The above equation formulates the step-by-step adjustment process 
which is taken by the banks in response to any change in the policy 
variables. Assume: 
np = 1, AT = ACL = FR =0, then: 
AD^ = AUR^+FR^_^-ARR^, 
^In general, the change in the policy variable due to making a dis­
crepancy between actual and desired level of the free reserves affects in­
directly the change in the level of the deposit. 
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or 
AD^ = FR^. 
These equations state that as the Fed increases its policy variable namely 
UR, by the amount equal to "A" dollars, then as a first step, the deposit 
level would increase by the same amount. Then, banks would hold a surplus 
of reserves or positive free reserves by the amount of "A" dollars. 
By the above equations 
AD^ = A+0-0 
AD^ = A. 
Assume initially FR^-l"^ and ARR^=0. 
In the second step, we have AUR=0. Banks still hold their surplus equal 
to the amount of "A" dollars. Because under the LRA system, no required 
reserves have been applied to the banks' extra deposits. Thus, in the 
second step by the above equations, it is written: 
AD^ = O+A-0 
AD^ — A. 
By the same reasoning, the third, and subsequent steps would give the 
same results and AD would be equal to the amount of the original change in 
t h e  p o l i c y  v a r i a b l e  (  =  " A "  d o l l a r s ) . ^  
'+In contrast to LRA under CRA, when we assume n^ = n, = n^, = 0, 
np = 1, and AT = ACL = FR* = 0, then 
AD^ = AUR^+FR^_j or AD^ = ARR^+FR^ . 
In the first step, it is originally known: AUR = "A" dollars, then by the 
above equations, it is shown: 
(Footnote continued on following page). 
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As we have seen in equation (32) under LRA variable FR^ can be ex­
pressed as: 
< = -H(^) = -HO 
where i = The short-term Treasury bill rate; 
r = The rate for the cost of the borrowings; 
r^ = The rate for the return on holding surplus. 
i is considered to be exogenous to the system, r depends upon the supply 
of and demand for funds in the FFM. It also depends upon the amount of 
the surplus and borrowings in the banking system, r^ is also a function 
of the transactions in the FFM and in the banking system. Taking the FFM 
transactions into account, the r and r^ can be expressed as the functions 
of i, d, and FR (or UR); 
FR^ = fî(i^,r^) n^.<0, ny>0 (37) 
= R(UR^,d^) RuR<0, R^>0 (38) 
(Footnote continued from preceding page). 
AD^ = A+0 
AD|. =6A+(1-Ô)A. 
In the second step, we have: 
aD^ = 0+(1-Ô)A 
aD^ - 6(1-Ô )A+(1-6) A 
and so on.... As it is seen under CRA, as a result of the change in the 
policy variable URf, the change in the deposit level would increase by the 
same amount as in the first step. Due to the increased required reserves, 
AD^ would still increase in the latter steps, but continuously by a small­
er amount than the original increase in the policy variable. 
40 
where d = The FRB's discount rate which is considered to be exo­
genous to the system (See Appendix I, FFM under aggregate 
reserves instrument). 
From equations (36), (37), and (38) we can write: 
where 
FRt " " it,R(URt,dt) = h(i^,d^.UR^) 
8FR, 
-r- = h. = n.<0 
9lt 1 1 
(39) 
3FR, 
= h . = n.-R. > 0 9d^ d r d 
aFR. 
URT " '^UR " "r'RuRC 0. 
Therefore, equation (36) can be rewritten as: 
-n. 1-nn 
"D 'D 'D 
l-n., Hp 
-Tzè "Ci-t + TI; "t-i 
'D 'D 
(40) 
It can be written: 
FRt_i H URt_i-RRt_i 
K^t-l " ^^t-3 ^Tt-3' 
Then, equation (40) is rewritten as: 
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or 
''"t = UR, - ^  URfl 
l-rl-r- l-Hn. 1 l-Hp 
'Tt + -T^  ""t ^ ^"t-l • (") 
hdt.dj.UR,) +î^ u«t-^ ""t-i -15 "'t 
T(l-np) l-rip, 
Tt-2 l-rip ^t-3 "T^ ^ ^'"t 
6 . . o + D^. (42) I-IIQ t-2 l-Hg t-3 
sjnder the system of LRA, one can write the following identity: 
UR,-FR,-,T,.2 
"t-2 = « 
It is not feasible to estimate the level of FR^ for the purpose of esti­
mating the level of AD^ using the above identity. Under the LRA system, 
there is a direct and one-to-one relationship between URt and FR^ at 
time t. As the Fed sets the level of UR^, then the level of FR^ is also 
determined given RR^; 
FRt H UR^-(6D^_2+TT^_2). 
Therefore, we are able to estimate ADJ directly based on the policy vari­
able given the exogenous variables. It is possible however, to estimate 
the level of FR^ based on the policy variable, the lagged exogenous vari­
ables, and the tagged values of deposits, interest rates, and FR. The 
estimated FR cannot be used for the purpose of estimating the level or 
change of deposit. Thus, it can be written: 
6np ô(l-nrr) 
AF^t " h(Tt_2'dt_2'URt-2) " '''^t-2 l-n^ ^h-3 
(Footnote continued on following page). 
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Define 
Then, equation (42) can be rewritten as: 
aD^ = - rh(i^,d^,UR^) + r/npUR^ - r/np(l-np)UR^_2 
- "/np(l-n^)AT^- r/npT 'T^_2+ r/npT.(l-np)T^ _ 3  
+ r/np(l-nQ|_)ACL^-r/n^ôD^_2+ r/np*6-(l-np)D^_2. (43) 
The following specifications about the signs and magnitudes of the 
coefficients of equations (40), (41), (42) can be made. In reality, the 
ability of the banks to accurately forecast and adjust the errors in the 
anticipation for is very restricted. So, n^ is small, and close to 
zero, and as we have seen: 
0<np, nj, n^^<l, 0<6,T<1. It can therefore be written: 
0 < r = < 1, 0 < 1-np <1, 0 < 1-n-p < 1, 
D 
0 < l-fiQL < 1. 
(Footnote continued from preceding page). 
+ AUR^ + 
6(l-ny)-T( l-njj) 
AT t-2 
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In equation (43) we will have: 
-1 < Coeff. of UR^_2 = - f/Mp (l-np) < 0, 
-1 < Coeff. of AT^= -r/p (l-n-j.) < 0, 
-1 < Coeff. of T^_2 = - r/p^«T<0, 
0 < Coeff. of T(l-np) < 1, 
0 < Coeff. of ACL^ = (l-n^^) < 1, 
-1 < Coeff. of D. . = - 6 < 0, 
Hp 
0 < Coeff. of 2 ~ (l-Hp) < 1. 
In equation (41) we can specify the coefficients of other variables as 
follows: 
Coeff. of RRo. = ^ < -1, 
t Hp — 
0 < Coeff. of RR^_i = ^ (l-np) < 1. 
Similarly in equation (40) we have: 
0 < Coeff. of FR.j._j^ = r < 1» 
Coeff. of ARR^= "1" 
From equation (39) we have: h^ = n^<0, h^ = n^R^>0, and hyp<0. 
So from equation (41) or (43) results: 
3(AD.) 
-  «U A 
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3(AD.) 
-91— = " ' 0 
9(AD.) 
^ - rhjR > 0-
From equation (37) we have: = |n^| and from equation (38), in reality, 
we expect: < 1.^ So: |hj| < |h^| or 
8(AD^) 9(AD^) 
adt or the change in deposit supply is more re­
sponsive to the change in i^ than to d^. 
For the purpose of fitting the deposit supply equations and estimat­
ing the coefficients, we will use a linear approximation of equation (30) 
within a reasonable range of (i^-d^). So equation (39) can be rewritten 
as: 
FR  ^ = aj+aji^ +ajd^MjUR .^ 
So equation (43) can be written as: 
^•^t " "^®0~^^l''t"^^2^t'*'^n^ " ragiURt " ^  (l-np)UR F/u"t-l 
Î anticipate bj to be high due to reluctance of banks for borrowing 
I's discount window and to be high due to efficient transforma-
6We
from FRB'
tion of funds to and from the FFM. See Appendix I, FFM under aggregate 
reserves instrument. 
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+ ^  (l-HcL^ACLt -  — 4Dt_2+ a;- '  *'( l -nF)'Dt-3'  (44) 
Equation (44) is the reduced form for the change in deposit  supply 
which is empir ical ly est imated in Part I I  of Chapter IV, In specifying 
the signs of the coeff icients for the interest rates and the pol icy 
variable UR^, we can wri te; 
Thus: 
a ^ —  h ^ < O j  a 2 ~ h j > 0 j  a  g  —  ^ [ J R  ^  *  
Coeff.  of i^ = -  ra^ > 0 
Coeff.  of d^ = -  rag < 0 
Coeff.  of UR^ -  —— -  ra^ > 0. 
I t  is also known: 
la^l  > [agi 
so 
7 [Coeff.  of i^ l  > [Coeff.  of d^|.  
^Using an alternative form for f inding the FFR from the FFM (see Ap­
pendix I ,  FFM under aggregate reserves instrument) we can get an alterna­
t ive equation for equation (44). We had: 
FRj = 0(1t.r^) 
So: FR^ = a[ i j .Rg(FRj,d^) = h'( i t .dt,FRj).  
With l inear approximation, one can wri te: 
(Footnote continued on fol lowing page) 
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(Footnote continued from preceding page). 
^"^t Go+ai ' ' t '^G2'^t ' ' 'G3FKt'  
where 
3FR+ -
"3 "  FR ^ 0'  
3FRt a 
*2 = -3d: = "r^ d > 0'  
SFR. 
"1 "  "IT^ "  S- ^ 0'  
Under the system of LRA, we have: 
FRt = ""t  -  ®t-2 - 'Tt-2 
thus :  
Therefore, equation (44) can be rewrit ten in the fol lowing manner: 
°  ^  (I-nplURt. i  
-  ^  )Tt.2+ a;T(l-"F)Tt-3 
+ ^  «)Dt.2+ ^  «tl-"F)Dt-3-
As we not ice, al l  signs of the coeff icients are the same in the above 
equation as equation (44). The magnitude of the coeff icients for T._2 and 
^t-2 absolute value are not necessari ly less than one. 
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Part I I I .  Model I I  
Inclusion of the cert i f icates of deposit  transactions in Model I  (Model I I  
under contemporaneous reserve accounting) 
Large cert i f icates of deposit  are commercial bank t ime deposit  l iabi l­
i t ies which are issued in denominations of $100,000 or more. Cert i f icates 
of deposit  are either negotiable or nonnegotiable. Negotiable cert i f i ­
cates of deposit  are those which can be sold in the secondary market. They 
can be considered as money market instruments. The maturi ty dates on CD's 
usual ly are thir ty to ninety days. Like al l  t ime deposits, CD's are sub­
ject to reserves requirements and FDIC insurance payments. Most CD's are 
direct ly sold by banks to investors in the primary market. A small  por­
t ion of CD's are issued through dealers in the secondary market. 
Part I I  concentrated on commercial-bank investments or earning as­
sets as an instrumental variable for the banks' portfol io management. In 
real i ty, and especial ly within the last twenty years, l iabi l i ty management 
involving the issuance of CD's has come to be an important instrument for 
the bank's portfol io adjustment. Studies on the banks' behavior indicate 
that the banks try to optimize their investments portfol ios and, thus, CD 
l iabi l i t ies. Then, based on these optimum values, the banks adjust their 
short-term (one to two weeks) instrumental variables, namely the FFM tran­
sactions and/or borrowings from FRB's. In this part i t  is assumed that 
the banks choose the decision variables I  and CD to maximize the expected 
level of their prof i t .  The variables D", T, and CT are known and the vari-
bles CA and the reserve rat ios are constant with respect to banking behav­
ioral relat ionships. As a result  of the optimization, the desired values 
for FR and/or supply of deposit  are derived. 
48 
In Part I I I ,  CD transaction is included in Model I  from Part I I  using 
the CRA system. Individual bank J 's balance sheet can be wri t ten as 
fol lows: 
Balance Sheet of Bank J 
Assets Liabi l i t ies 
J 
YCD. 
Reserves total 
Required 
against demand 6D. 
deposit  ^ 
against t ime TT 
deposit  
against large 
negotiable 
cert i f icates 
of deposit  
Surplus 
excess reserves ER^ 
Loans in FFM FFL^ 
Commercial loans 
Other investments 
Miscel laneous assets 
RR. 
R. 
CL 
MA, 
Demand Deposits 
Federal Government 
Al l  Others 
Time Deposits 
Large negotiable 
cert i f icates of 
deposit  
Borrowi ng 
From FRB's 
From FFM 
Miscel laneous 1 ia-
bi l i t ies and 
Capital 
FFB. 
D. 
T^ 
CD^ 
•* 
B 
MAj+ 
CA, 
where: y = required reserve rat io against CD, 
The def ini t ion of the other variables in the balance sheet of bank J are 
the same as those seen in Part I I .  
iBank J is assumed to be a large bank which issues CD's, does not 
buy the CD's issued by other banks, and does not repurchase i ts own CD's. 
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or 
From bank J 's balance sheet, i t  can be wri t ten: 
RRj E 6Dj + tTj + YCDj (45) 
FRj ,  Oj + Tj -  RRj -  CLj -  I j  + CDj + CAj 
FRj 5 Dj( l-5) + TJ(I-T) + CDjd-y) -  CLj -  I j  + CAj. (46) 
Taking into account the same set of assumptions in Part I I ,  the outcome of 
FRj depends upon the real izat ion of the variables Dj,  Tj,  and CLj for any 
chosen value for I j  and CDj by prof i t  maximization procedure. Similar to 
Part I I ,  i t  can be wri t ten that: 
FRJ = FRJ + XJ,  
FR J  = DJ(l -Ô) + T J (1-T)-CL J - I J +CD J (1-Y)+CA J  (47)  
X = XP(l-6) + XY(l -T)-XCL .  
Using equation (47), FÏÏ j  is control led by the decision variables I j  and 
CD J. The optimization of IJ  and CDJ would optimize FRJ. 
From equation (47) i t  can be wri t ten: 
3FR, 2 
= -1, = 1- Y .  
al j  1'  3CDj 
Based on the same behavioral assumption as seen in Part I I ,  the bank J 's 
expected prof i t  can be stated. 
^Bank J is small  component of the banking system. 
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Pj Kj+r^^CLj+iI j -  ^r^D+Gj CDj+rsFRj 
/
"FR1 __ % 
(FRj+Xj)d<j,j(Xj) (48) 
a 
where 
r^g = the offer ing rate paid on CD, 
Gj = the average subject ive cost of issuing CD. 
The subject ive cost of issuing CD for the representat ive individual bank J 
can be explained by the fol lowing variables: 
1) Outstanding level of CD -
The higher the outstanding level of CD issued by bank J, the higher the 
subject ive cost is for issuing addit ional CD. As the amount of CD issued 
becomes larger, the soundness of bank J comes increasingly into question. 
2) Amount of commercial loans -
Issuing CD is associated with a high f ixed cost ( i .e.,  insurance premiums, 
required reserves) and no other variable cost besides interest payment on 
CD. Therefore, bank J uses the funds of issuing CD to f inance i ts com­
mercial loans with a durat ion of several weeks. This hypothesis has been 
supported in several studies (see Luckett (29), Depamphil is (13), and 
Stigum (37)).  As the demand for commercial loans increases, banks bear 
less subject ive discomfort or cost for issuing addit ional CD. CL is also 
included as an explanatory variable for e. 
As a result ,  i t  is stated that: 
^ GJ(CDJ, CLJ) 
where 
aCDj > aCLj 
51 
To maximize the expected prof i t ,  equation (48) is dif ferentiated with 
respect to decision variables CDj and I j .  
3 P. 
91. = i+(r-r^) 
B(-FRj) 
S' 31 
-FRJ 
(Xj+fRj)d$j(Xj) 
3(-FRJ) 
3FR. 
+ r  
s 91 
SP-
aCD. 
-  96J -
-
. _ 
CDj + (r-r^) '  
9(-FRJ) 
9CD. 
-FRJ 
3 J  (Xj+FRj)d«j(Xj) 
9(-FRJ )  
Therefore, FOC can be stated as: 
+ r  . 
s 9CDj 
Thus 
-  r-3 = 0 i+(r-r^).  ["-«(-FR J )  
- - <-S:' CDj-(r-rs)(l-Y) + r,Xl-y) = 0. 
$(-FRJ) 
i -r .  
r-r .  
or 
FRj '  -» J (?:?;) • (49) 
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Then i t  can be wri t ten: 
or 
or 
8e, i -r  
'(^cD+ej)- acDT • CDj+(r-r^)( l-Y) • r^H-r) = 0 
0 s 
ae, 
-(rCD+Cj) -  iCSy - CDj + (1-TH = 0 
se, 
-ej(CDj.CLj) -  ^  (CDj.CLj) .  CDj = -  (1-Y)1. (50) 
u 
Then, the optimum value of CDj can be stated as 
^*^0 ~ (51) 
The SOC for the prof i t  maximization requires that the principal 
minors of the relevant Hessian determinant al ternate in sign, and start­
ing with the f i rst one, every other one in the Hessian determinant is 
negative. Or 
fp 
9l^ 
< 0 and 
fp 
al^ 
It, 
aCD 9l  
3^P 
si  SCD 
aCD^ 
^In actual i ty, any individual bank J can change --  in part icular, re­
duce i ts CD l iabi l i t ies — relat ively slowly by al lowing them to mature or 
by holding back the issuance of new CD's. However, this problem is of less 
signif icance. 
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Differentiat ing the FOC, i t  is writ ten: 
4 MzM . l i rm 
® ;(-m 
or 
4= .  (r-r )  .  < 0 
AR ^ 3(-FR) 
or 
r-r^ >0 r > r^. 
A 
91^ 
9^P 
9CD9I 
J!L-
919CD 
2 d f P _  
9CD' 
( r-r j  
^ 9{-FR) 
90 
9CD 
A, 
9CD' 
CD -  aCF + (r-rs)( l-T) 9$(-FR) 
9(-FR) 
(1-Y) 
(r-rJ 9$ 
9(-FR) 
(1-Y) 
2 CD -  2(1-r )(1-Y)2 > 0. 
dLU acDT ^ 
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Given FR^ and CDj from equations (49.) and (51), the optimum value for in­
vestment from equation (47) has resulted as: 
C '  ^ Tj( l-x) -  CLj + 
+qj( i ,rcD,CLj) • ( l -y) + CAj. (52) 
Assuming al l  banks face the same interest rates and the same reserve 
requirement rat ios, the equations for the aggregate banking system can be 
wri t ten: 
"O _* 1-r_ 
FR = Z FR, = -  ,( ,(—^) (53) 
J=1 
and ^>0. 
Similarly, for the banking system as a whole'* i t  can be stated that: 
*  "o ^ "O 
"  j l i  ^ 9j( i ,RCQ ,CLj) 
'^In general,  large banks issue CD's and small  banks buy CD's. The 
banks get no reduction in the required reserves against their CD l iabi l i ­
t ies as they buy CD's issued by other banks. Therefore, the large banks 
do not buy the CD's issued by other banks. On the other hand, small  banks 
do not issue CD's because there is no market for them. In this study, 
CD's are considered only as the l iabi l i t ies of the banking system. CD 
l iabi l i t ies are relat ively larger in volume and play a relat ively more 
important role in the adjustment process of the banking system than CD's 
do as assets. 
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CD* = q( i ,rrn,CL),^ '* (54) 
or 
* 
rn - -i V 
Where i t  is assumed 
"n CL = CL, 
J=1 
and Q funct ion exhibits the same propert ies as function. 
5In the banking system, at any point in t ime a large amount of is­
sued CD's are matured and a large number of new CD's are issued. There­
fore, in the banking system CD's can be assumed to be relat ively f lexible as 
any of the explanatory variables, i ,  r^p, and CL change. Hence, the prob­
lem stated in Footnote 3 becomes less signif icant from the point of view 
of the banking system as a whole. 
^Alternatively, equation (54) can be derived by using the l inear 
approximation for the average subject ive cost of issuing CD by bank J. 
I t  can be stated: 
ej(CDj,CLj) -
where 
3e. 
BCD'. and 
9e^ 
3CC = Agj < 0. 
'J ""J 
By substi tut ing the above relat ionship in equation (50), the result  is:  
Thus: 
"^OJ -A2jCLj -Ay CDj r^, p- ( 1 -Y ) i ,  
*  -A 
CDj = 2A OJ ,  1-Y .  + TTm 1 - 1 
A 2J 
2A, 2Aj_j CD 2Ay CL J* 
Then, in aggregate for the banking system, i t  is writ ten as: 
* CD = 
n 0 A 
-  E OJ 
J=1 
'0 
(1-Y) 1 
J=1 2A IJ 
(Footnote continued on following page). 
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The balance sheet and identi t ies for the banking system as a whole 
can be wri t ten as fol lows. 
Balance Sheet of the Banking System 
Assets 
Reserves Total 
Required 
against demand 
deposit  
against t ime 
deposit  
against CD 
Surplus 
excess reserves 
loans in FFM 
Commercial loans 
Other Investments 
Miscel laneous Assets 
6D 
TT 
YCD 
ER 
FFL 
RR 
CL 
I  
MA 
Liabi l i t ies 
Demand Deposits 
Federal Government 
Al l  Others 
Time Deposits 
CD 
Borrowing 
from FRB's 
Federal Fund 
borrowings 
Miscel laneous l iabi l i t ies 
and Capital 
CD 
B* 
B 
FFB 
MA+CA 
(Footnote continued from preceding page). 
'0 
J=1 ZAij  •^CD 
'0 A 
-  E 2J 
J=1 
CL. 
Thus, 
where 
CD = BQ+(L-Y)BJI-BJR^P+B2CL 
n. 
(55) 
BCD 
•ai 
'0 
=  ( i - y ) b i  -  ( 1 - y )  %  p i —  >  o j  
^ J=1 
(Footnote continued on following page). 
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RR h  6D + tT + yCD, (56) 
FR H D+T-RR-CL-I+CD+CA, 
or 
FR = D(,1- ô)+TC1- t)+CDU- y}-CL-I+CA, (57) 
The aggregate of FR from equation (47) would be 
FR = D(l - < s)+T(l -T)-Cr-I+CD(1 - y j+CA, (58) 
The optimum level for the demand for investment by the banking system 
can be found by substi tut ing for the values of FR and CD from equations 
(53) and (54) in equation (58). 
*  _ _ i -r  
I  = D(l-6)+T(l-T)-CL+4;(-3^)+(l-Y)Q(i,r( ,p,CL)+CA .  (59) 
Assume there exist nondecreasing marginal subject ive costs of issuing 
CD in the banking system, 
or 
3CD -  u 
where 
9e MSC = 3CD • 
In other words, the higher the level of outstanding CD, the higher the 
subject ive cost is for issuing addit ional CD. Moreover, assume 
(Footnote continued from preceding page) 
"O 
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imsçi< 0 
9CL -
which means that the higher the demand for commercial loans, the lower the 
subject ive cost is for issuing addit ional CD. Equation (50) in the aggre­
gate level can be rewrit ten as equation M; 
M = e(CD,CL) + ^  (CD,CL) • ] i  = 0. (60) 
To obtain the comparative stat ic results, CD can be dif ferentiated 
with respect to i ,  r^^, and CL. Using implici t  function theorem from 
equation (60) i t  can be stated that: 
> 0 ,  a CD* _ ^M/ai _ -d-T) 
^M/acD* 9e ,  9e ,  3^e 
+ TT^ + CD 9CD 3CD acD? 
BM/ 
a CD ^ ^ 1 
^^CD ae + jae + .  a^e 
<  0 ,  
aCD acD ,[^2 
,2, 
* + CD - ^ ® 
aCD ^ _ "^3CL ^ _ aCL acL-aCD ^ ^ 
aCL BM/gcD* Se ae pp. a^e 
+ + CD • 
aCD acD acD^ 
The optimum investment from equation (59) can be di f ferentiated with re­
spect to i ,  r^Q, r ,  and CL 
* 
al 
ai ai ' ai = # + # (1-Y) > 0, 
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al _ 
9r 9r < 0 ,  
= ( i -v) < 0. 
9rcD 
| ~  =  -  1 ^  +  1 ^  ( 1 - y).  which has an ambiguous sign. 
With the same assumption about the expectat ions of the variables, as 
stated in Part I I ,  equation (59) can be rewrit ten as: 
I  = (1-6) n[,(D-D_I)+D_; + (1-T)  n^(T-T_J)+T 
n^L(CL-CL_J)+CL_J  np(FR -FR_j)+FR_J 
or 
+ (1-Y) (CD -CD_^)+CD_^ (CA-CA_^)+C/V_^ 
* 
I  - (1-ô )D_^+(1-T)T_J-CL_^-FR_^+(1-Y )CD_^+CA_J 
Thus 
NP(L-6)AD+NJ(L-T)AT-N(^|^ACL-NP(FR -FR ^)  
+ ( I -Y)CD* - (l -YJCD_J+ACA. 
I  -  NQ(L-(S)AD+NJ(.L-T)AT-NQ|^ACL-NP(,FR -FR ^)  
+ (L-Y)CD -(L-Y)CD_I+ CA. ( 6 1 )  
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From the balance sheet of the banking system, i t  is known 
R+CL+I 5 D+T+CD+B*+CA 
or 
UR+CL+I H D+T+CD+CA, 
so 
AD = AUR-AT+ACL-ACD*-ACA+AI*, (62) 
where: AL = AL* and ACD = ACD*.  
By substi tut ing for the values of AL and CD in equation (62) the supply 
of deposit  for the banking system is derived 
ad = aur-at+acl-aca-cd*+cd_J+nQ(l-<5)ad 
+n-|-( l-T)AT-nQ|^ACL-np(FR -FR_j^ )  + (1-Y)CD 
-(1-Y)CD_J+ACA, 
or 
AD = l-rnp( 1- 6) AUR -( L-NJ+TNJ)AT+(L-N0|^) ACL 
-NP(FR -FR_^) - YCD +YCD_^ (63) 
Brief ly considering the CD market, i t  can be wri t ten 
CD° = CD°(r(,Q, i ,  Y) 
where CD^ = demand for CD by nonbank-publ ic; i t  is reasonable to assume 
that the demand for CD, l ike any other demand for f inancial securi t ies or 
cert i f icates, is a function of i ts own rate and the interest rate on 
close substi tute securi t ies and income level or GNP. Moreover, i t  is rea­
sonable to wri te 
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scd" ,  0. #  < 0, 0. 
arcD '  
Equation (54) can be restated as the desired supply of CD by the banking 
system ^ 
CD^ = CD^(i,  r^Q, CL) 
where 
^ , 0 ,  ^ > 0 .  
ar^P '  9i '  aCL 
For the CD market equi l ibr ium, i t  can be stated: 
or 
Thus, 
where 
CD^ = CD^ 
CD^(r^Q, i ,  CL) -  CD°(r^Q, i ,  Y) = 0. 
= R^pl i ,  Y, CL), (64) 
aCoS acoD 
S^CD _ "TÏ aT 
acpf _ aCD° 
0 ,  
_ aCpD 
^^CD _ aY 
aCpS _ aCD° 
^^CD 
<  0 ,  
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3r 
_ÇD = 
3CL 
aCD"' 
3CL 
aCD^ aCD° 
Substi tut ing from equation (64) into equation (54), the result  is;  
or 
where 
CD = Qti ,CL,R(,p(i ,Y.CL)] 
CD* = Q®(i,CL,Y) (65) 
BCD* _ 9Q ^ 9Q 
sCL 9CL cir^Q 9CL 
> 0 ,  
9CD ^ __9^ 
"  9Y 9r, 
9r CD 
CD 9Y 
0 ,  
9CD ^ ^  _ fç 
9i 91 ar^p ' 91 
CD 
which has an ambiguous sign and depends on relat ive elast ici t ies of the 
supply of and the demand for CD with respect to i  and r^^. 
7 > M 
* 
9CD _ 9CD^ 9CD^ 
9CD^ 
9CL 
gCL gCL 3^00 9CD^ 9CD^ 
^^CD _ 
9CL 
aCD^ 
S^CD 
9CD^ 
9CL '  
9CD° 
S^CD 
acof aCD^ 
grcD aCL 
gCD^ 
9CL '  
9CD° 
B^CD 
9CD^ 9CD° 9CD^ 9CD° 
^^CD ^^CD 
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From the FFM, the equations (13) and (14) in Part I I  can be restated: 
Pf = F(i .r)  
r  = R(d,FR). 
Thus, 
or 
where 
PR = F[ i ,R(d,FR)] 
FR = h®[i .d,FR] ( 6 6 )  
^<0, 8FR 
3d 
0. < 0.  
Final ly, i t  is known from the balance sheet for the banking system that 
FR 5 UR-(5D-TT-YCD. (67) 
Then, using equations (66), (65), (63), and the identi ty (67), the struc­
tural equations for the system are restated as a system: 
1) FR* = hf( i ,d,FR) 
2) CD = Q * ( i , Y , C L )  
3) AD = (1-67 [AUR+(l-nQ|^)ACL-(l-nj+Tnj)AT 
-  np(FR*-FR_i)-YCD*+YCD_i]  
4) FR 5 UR-ôD-TT-YCD*. 
Assuming banks adjust to their desired level of free reserves, the 
actual level of free reserves in the banking system is derived from the 
above structural equations: 
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anp a 
FR = h*( i .d.FR) + 
6nr 
1- l -np(l-6) FR - 1  
1 - l -ngt l-ô) AUR T -
6(l-nj+Tnj) 
I- I dCI-Ô) AT 
^CI-H c l )  
l -Rgf1-6) ACL - 1- -np(l-ô) Y •  C r ( i , Y , C L )  
1 f-l-np(1-6j • y • CD_J, 
6nr ôrir  
Define: 
^ "  l-nQ(i-6) ~ { l - n ^ ) + 6 r \ ^  
Then, i t  is seen 
0 < r  < 1. 
On the other hand, n^ is small  real ist ical ly; therefore. 
(68) 
°  ^  "  (l-np)+ôn[3 ^ 1'  
Equation (67) is rewrit ten as: 
FR = rh®(i,d,FR) + ( l-r}FR_j + ( l-r /np)AUR - |^T-r/np(l-n^+Tn^^ AT 
.r /np(l-ncL)ACL -  ( l-r /np)Y-Q®(i,Y,CL)+(l-r /np)YCD-l,  (69) 
where 
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fR ^-îr-  U-r/nph 
-l.r aFR 
which has an ambiguous sign. 
P  9 F R  
9FR 9d n 
3FR .  ^  
=3 > U 
- H r . g -
BCD 
3FR 
9CL 
-r /npd-n^,^) -  ( l-r /np)YâcL 
< 0. 
-1+ r  9FR 9FR 
Equation (69) can be stat ist ical ly est imated and the predicted value of 
FR can be substi tuted in the identi ty of 
s 1/6 UR -  T/6 T -  Y/ÔCD -  1/6FR 
to predict the level of the deposit  supply for the banking system. 
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Inclusion of the Eurodol lars and cert i f icates of deposit  transactions in 
Model I  (Model I I  under lagged reserve accounting) 
Eurodol lar (EURO) deposits are those denominated in dol lars and ac­
cepted by the banks outside the United States. Al l  EURO deposits have some 
f ixed term which ranges from overnight to f ive years. Most EURO transac­
t ions are in the range of six months and under. The banks borrow and lend 
in dol lar denominations among themselves and nonbank-corporat ions in the 
EURO market. The overnight EURO loans and borrowings are the alternative 
sources to the FFM for loans and borrowings for U.S. commercial banks. The 
longer term (thir ty to ninety days) EURO funds are the alternative sources 
of the funds from issuing CD's and sel l ing Treasury bi l ls.  Therefore, the 
rates on overnight EURO borrowings closely track FFR and the rates on long­
er term EURO borrowings closely track the money market rates such as r^^ 
and i .  Under the period which is considered in empir ical works in Chapter 
IV, the Fed imposed under Regulat ions M and D a reserve requirement against 
EURO borrowings. Currently, Regulat ions M and D require banks to hold re­
serve requirements against net EURO borrowings^ over a twenty-eight day 
averaging period. The technical i ty of the way that reserve requirements 
against EURO borrowings are calculated, and the ways that EURO transactions 
are cleared, make i t  possible for the banks to arbitrage between overnight 
EURO market and FFM. Similar ly, the banks arbitrage between the longer 
term EURO market and CD, or the Treasury bi l l  market. 
While f ixed term, f ixed rate loans in the EURO market are uncommon, 
in this part,  the short-term (three-months) EURO borrowings with f ixed 
^Borrowings minus loans. 
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interest rates are included in Model I  under LRA. Short-term EURO 
borrowings compete with issuing CD's or sel l ing Treasury bi l ls.  Therefore, 
in this part,  i t  is assumed that banks try to optimize their investment, 
CD, and EURO borrowing portfol ios. Based on these optimum values, the 
banks adjust their FFM transactions and borrowings from the FRB's. There­
fore, the banks choose the decision variables I ,  CD, and EURO borrowings 
to maximize the expected level of their prof i t .  The variables D, T and CL 
are known. The reserve rat ios and CA are constant with respect to banking 
behavioral relat ionships. The balance sheet of a representat ive bank is:  
Balance Sheet of Representat ive Bank 
Assets Liabi l i t ies 
Reserves total 
Required 
against demand 
deposits 
against t ime 
deposits 
against CDs 
against EURO 
borrowings 
Surplus 
excess reserves 
loans in FFM 
Commercial loans 
Other Investments 
Miscel laneous Assets 
RR, 
6D 
t -2 
TT 
t-2 
yCD 
t-2 
ojU 
t -2 
ER. 
FFL, 
CL, 
MA, 
Demand Deposits D^ 
Federal Government Dg 
t  
Al l  Others D 
Pt 
Time Deposits T^ 
CD CD^ 
EURO Borrowings 
Borrowi ngs 
from FRB's 
from FFM FFB^ 
Miscel laneous l iabi l i t ies 
and Capital 
t  
* 
MA^f 
CA, 
where w = Required reserve rat io against U; 
U^ = EURO borrowings at t ime t .  
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The defini t ion of the other variables in the above balance sheet are 
the same as seen in Model I I  under CRA. 
The fol lowing identi t ies for the representat ive bank can be wri t ten 
RRt a 6DJ_2+tTJ_2+tCDJ_2+>»U^.2 (70) 
FR^ E Dj-T^-RR^-CLj-I j+CD^+Uj.CAj. (71) 
With the same behavioral assumptions as seen in Part I I ,  the out­
come of FR^ depends upon the real izat ion of the variables D^, T^, and 
CL^ for any chosen value for I^,  CD^, and by the prof i t  maximization 
procedure. For the representat ive bank, i t  can be wri t ten 
FRt = FRt + Xt 
FR^ = + T^ -  CL^ -  I^ + CD^ + U^- RR^ + CA^, (72) 
Oj 0-» Oj 
^t "  *0^+ *CLt '  
Given RR^ based on the past values of variables and constant CA^, the 
optimization of the variables I^,  CD^, and would optimize FR^. 
Assuming the representat ive individual bank J is a small  component of 
the banking system from equation (72) i t  is shown that: 
sFR, aFRi sFR, 
^t  
~W, TcdT ~ W. 
""t  t  t  
Bank J 's expected prof i t  can be stated as: 
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(73) 
where 
ry = Thirty to ninety days EURO borrowing rate; 
G1 = The average subject ive cost of borrowing from the EURO 
The subject ive cost for borrowing from the EURO market, for the represen­
tat ive individual bank J, can be explained by the fol lowing variables. 
1) Outstanding level of EURO borrowing -  The higher the U, the higher 
the subject ive cost is for borrowing an addit ional unit  from the 
EURO market. 
2) Outstanding level of CD -  Similar ly the higher the outstanding level 
of CD issued by bank J, the higher the subject ive cost is for bor­
rowing from the EURO market. The larger CD l iabi l i t ies or U l iabi l­
i t ies puts the bank's soundness more under question. 
3) Amount of commercial loans -  Banks use funds from sources l ike CD 
issuance and EURO market borrowing to f inance their commercial loans 
(see Stigum (37)).  Thus, the higher the demand for commercial loans, 
the lower the subject ive cost is for the borrowing from the EURO 
market. 
Other less signif icant variables such as London interbank offered 
rates on EURO (LIBOR) and economic or pol i t ical states of foreign coun­
tr ies can also be considered as explanatory variables for explaining the 
t  
market. 
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subject ive cost of borrowing EURO ' S . % Only three variables, CD, U, and 
CL, would be considered as explanatory variables of e-, in this study. 
Moreover, the subject ive cost of issuing CD would also depend upon the 
level of EURO borrowings in this part.  The higher the level of EURO bor­
rowing, the higher the subject ive cost for issuing addit ional CD is ex­
pected. As a result ,  i t  can be stated that 
where 
96, ae, ae, J 4. 
> 0, -Ti l  > 0, and '  < 0• 
And, 
where 
aCD, aU, aCL, 
^t  ^t  "^t 
E-, = Gi (U, ,CD, ,CL, ) 
'^t  ^t  '^t ^t  ^t  
Sej 3c J 3 G J 
aUT ^ aCDT acTT ^ 
^t  ^t "^t 
To maximize the expected prof i t ,  equation (75) is dif ferentiated with 
respect to decision variables K ,  CD, ,  and U, .  
"^t "^t t  
aP 9(- f r  ) 
> . 
t  
aFR, 
zpor the purpose of short-run study, these variables are considered 
to be constant. 
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3  ^
-, 
W C
O 1 
w \ _  
t  CD .1 
4 
t 
3CD, 8CD, 
-FR. 
+ (r-rL) 
s'  BCD. 3(-FR I  )  
3FR. 
+ r  
s 3CD • 
3P. 
3U. 
aej -
t  
3U, 
- '^t.  
• CD, -
"^t 
t  
3U. 
_ ' ' t j  
-FR. 
3(-FRi ) (Xjt '  
+(r-rs) -âû: 
3(-FR, ) 
3FR. 
+ r  
s 3U. 
Therefore, FOC can be stated as: 
i+(r-rg) [-${-FRj ) j  -r^ =  0  
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Be. 9e. 
"  'SCDJ '  • '  3CDj '  • 
SGJ  SEJ  
( w r )  *  CDj -  (r^ j  +  e  )  - (^) • Uj -  (r-rg) 
u ^  t  U t  
• > • < • ; '  0 .  
Thus: 
or 
$(-FRi ) 
i -r.  
•^t r-r.  
( 7 4 )  
I t  can also be writ ten: 
ae. 
-  ^(CDj^.Uj^.CLj^) .  CDj^ 
d e  
9CD\ (CDj^'Uj^.CLj^) • Uj^ = r^Q-1 
t  t  t  
( 7 5 )  
and 
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d e  J .  
- e J^(CDj^,Uj^,CLj^)- (CDj^,Uj^,CLj^) • CDj^ 
*=Jt 
aOy .  Uj^ -  r^j- i .  (76) 
Then, the optimum value of CD, and U, can be stated as: 
"^t ^t 
( 7 7 )  
( 7 8 )  
The SOC for the profi t  maximization are stated as: 
3^P 
3 , 2  
< 0 ,  
a^P 3^P 
9I9CD 
2 2 3 P 9 P 
3I9CD aCD^ 
> 0, and 
& 
3,2 
-T^ 319CD 
3^P 
3l8U 
9^P 
91 3CD 
A_ 
aCD' 
3CD3U 
A_ 
9I9U 
9CD3U 
ô 
<  0 .  
^The usual practice in term-EURO transactions is to price them on a 
rol lover basis ( i .e., every month the EURO borrowings are repriced). 
Hence, Uj^ can be assumed to be relatively f lexible as any of the explana­
tory variables i ,  r^^, r^, CLj change. 
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Given FR, ,  CD, ,  and U, from equations (74), (77), and (78), the optimum 
"^t t  t  
value for investment from equation (72) for bank J has resulted as: 
*  —  —  —  - 1  
+ ol j^( i  ,r^|^,ry,CLj^) + o2j^(i  ,r^p,r^j,CLj^^ 
- RR, +CA, .  (79) 
""t ^t 
Assuming al l  banks face the same interest rates and the same reserves 
requirements rat ios, for the banking system in aggregate i t  can be writ ten 
^ "o * i-r 
FR. = e  FR, = -  *(—^) (80; 
^ J=1 "^t "^s 
a n d  ^ > 0  
* "o * "o 
or 
CDt 01^(i ,r j ,p,ry,CL^) (81) 
* "o * "O 
or 
^t "  02^(1,r^Q .r^.CL^) (82) 
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01 and 01 exhibit the same propert ies, respectively, as ol,  and 
o2. 
The balance sheet of the representative bank and the identit ies of 
(70) and (71) and equation (72) can be used for the banking system as a 
whole by redefining the variables as their aggregate levels. The optimum 
level for the demand for investment by the banking system can be writ ten 
as :  
+ 02^(1,rcQ.ry.CLt) -  RR^+CA^. (83) 
Taking into account the values of expectations from Part I I ,  the 
above equation can be rewritten as: 
^t ^ ["D^°t"°t- l^ '^ '^t- l ]  ["T^V^t-1^ ^t-1 
" ["cL^^'-t"^'"t- i^ '^^'-t- i .  '  ."pfFRtrFRt-i^^FRt-i.  
or 
-  [(RRt-KKt-l '+RKt-l (CA^-CA^ . I)+CA^_I  ]  
^^t nQAD^+nyAT^-n^^ACL^-np(FR^-FR^_^)+ACD^ 
+AU^-ARR^+ACA^. (84) 
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From the balance sheet of the banking system, i t  is known; 
or 
so 
URt+CLt+It '  Dt+Tt+CDt+Ut+CAt, 
ADt = AUR^-AT^+ACL^-ACD*-AU*-ACA^+AI*. (85) 
The supply of deposit for the banking system is derived as: 
AD^ = AUR^-AT^+ACL^-ACD*-AU*+ACA^+n[jAD^ 
* * 
+n^AT^-N(,^_ACL^-np(FR^-FR^_^)+ACD^+AU^-ARR^-ACA^ 
or 
AD. = t  l-nr AUR^- ( l-nj)AT ^ +( l-n^i^ ) ACL^ 
-npCFRfFRt.i j-ARRt (86) 
As observed above, the current desired level of changes in CD and U 
has no effect on the change in the deposit supply level. Given f ixed UR^ 
and the stable path of currency in the nonbank-public's hand, the changes 
in current CD^ and can affect the level of deposit supply due to the 
change in required reserves. Under the LRA system, i t  is known 
•^•^t = aDt_2+TTt_2+YCDt-2+wUt_2' 
Therefore, the changes in CD^ and can only affect 0^ after two weeks. 
Under the assumptions of the model, we f ind no direct l ink between and 
CDt or Uj. 
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Under LRA from the FFM, equation (39) from Part I I  can be restated: 
FRj = hd^.dj.URj) 
3FR. 9 FR. 9 FR. 
~W ^ ~9d~" "  ^ 0' 
Hence, the reduced form on the change in the level of deposit supply is 
derived as: 
^ ""t -  ^  ""t- l  -
+ % RRt + ^  RRt.i (87) 
or 
^°t ~ l-n^ hfi fdt 'URt) + i-r i j j  ^^t " l-n^ ^"^t- l  "  l-n^ ^^t 
T(l-np)_ l-nri Y 
"MT^^t-2'* '  1-np ' t-3+ Fn^ ^ ^^t" T-"n^ ^°t-2"^ l-n^ 
Define 
w(l-np) ô(l-np) 
î=n^ ^t-3" °t-2'^ ~T^ °t-3* (88) 
r . l= "F 
l-no 
Expectation on by the banks is relatively imperfect, so n^ is very 
small,  so 0 < r  1 < 1. I t  is also true that 
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Equations (87) and (88) then can be writ ten as 
ADj = -nh(it ,dj,URj)+ ^(l-nF)UVr 
r l  ,,  .  rl „„ , n ,, .  (89) 
and 
+ ^ ( i-"cL)ACLt- ^  RRt + ( i-"F)RRt-i 
r l  n ,, _ ., ,n r l  AD^ = -r lh(i^,d^,UR^)+ — UR^-— (l-np)UR^_^- — (l-n^)AT^ 
^  ""Tt-2+ ïï^ " '( l-"F)Tt_3+ ~ 
+ ^ • Y ( l-np^CDt-a-^ '" 'Ut-2+ ^ wfl-npiUt-S 
- ^ 6Dt_2+ ^  6(l-np)D^_3. (90) 
The fol lowing specif ications about the signs of the coeff icients of 
the above equations can be made: 
-1 < Coeff of URt_i = -  ~ (1-np) < 0 
F 
-1 < Coeff of aT^ = - (1-nj) < 0 
0 < Coeff of aCL^ = ^  (l-n^^) < 1 
Coeff of RR. = -  -^ < -1 
L F ~ 
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0 < Coeff of RR^_j = ^  (l-Opj < 1 
-1 < Coeff of T. 9 = -  T < 0 
\.-C Hp 
0 < Coeff of T^_2 = T(l-np) < 1 
-1 < Coeff of CD^_2 = -  .  y  < 0 
0 < Coeff of CD^_3 = + -^ Yll-np) < 1 
-1 < Coeff of U. 9 = -  • oj < 0 
X-c Up 
0 < Coeff of U^_2 ~ '  (l-Hp) < 1 
-1 < Coeff of D. ? = -  6 < 0 
Z - ù  Hp 
0 < Coeff of D^_2 = + ^  ô(l-np) < 1. 
With the same l inear approximation as seen in Part I I ,  i t  can be writ ten: 
AD^ = -  r lag-rla2i^-r la2d^+(rlnp-rla2)UR^- ^  (l-npjUR^^ 
-  ^  (l-"CL)ACLt- ^  RRt+ ^  (l-npiRRt-l 
(91) 
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or 
AD^ = -r lao-ria^i^-r lagd^+l^ -r lasiUR,- ^  (l"np)UR^_^ 
^  (l-n^-MV ^ tT^_2+ ^  T(l-np)Tt_3+ ^ (l-n (,L)ACL^ 
^CDt-2+ ^  Yfl-npiCDt-S- ^  'W'Ut-2+ ^ '^(^-"F^^t-3 
- 7^ 3Dt_2+ afl-np^Dt-s (92) 
where 
Coeff of i^ = -r la^ > 0 
Coeff of = -r lag < 0 
Coeff of UR. = + ^  - rla^ > 0. 
rip 0  
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Part IV. Model I I I  
Model I I  under Federal fund rate instrument with inclusion of repurchase 
agreement transactions using lagged reserve accounting 
The main tools available to the Fed in implementing i ts policies are: 
open-market operations (OMO), required reserve ratios, and discount rates. 
By the open market operation, we mean that FRB open market committee 
(FOMC) sel ls or buys the USGS's,^ hence, changes banks' reserves to 
achieve i ts target. Since eighty percent of the value of the Fed's assets 
consisted of USGS, the OMO has come to be the most important tool for 
policy implementation by the Fed. Obviously, the f irst task of the FOMC 
is to pursue a macro-economic target variable l ike ful l  employment, price 
stabil i ty, or a stable exchange rate for the dollar. The FOMC can try 
to achieve any of the above desirable targets via channels of money sup­
ply or the interest rate change. Having chosen i ts target, the FOMC has 
to decide which of the above channels to use. During the decade of the 
1960s, the FOMC gradually shifted i ts focus from interest rate strategy 
to money supply strategy by attempting to keep the growth of money supply 
on a targeted path. At the same t ime, the kind of instructions given by 
FOMC for implementing OMO showed a narrower band for control l ing FFR's 
variat ions. Therefore, i t  seems after the mid-sixt ies, FOMC has con­
trol led the FFR exogenously as a short-run instrumental variable to con­
trol the money supply path. In contrast to that, before the mid-sixt ies 
^In other words, FOMC demonetizes or monotizes some port ion of 
national debt. 
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reserve aggregates ( i .e., UR) as short-run instrumental variables seemed to 
play the dominant role.^ 
Theoretical ly, to explain the relationships among the monetary vari­
ables more realist ical ly for the t ime period undertaken by the empirical 
work of this study, in this part the FFR is considered as the short-run in­
strumental variable used by FOMC exogeneously to control money supply. In 
Parts I I  and I I I ,  UR is taken as exogenous and as a short-run instrumental 
variable. The problem in Parts I I  and I I I  is then, i f  UR is truly endo-
geneous, i t  would be affected by random shocks created by demand side vari­
ations by the nonbank-public. Thus, the models in Parts I I  and I I I  are 
mis-specif ied and have incorrectly channeled the nonbank-public's random 
shocks to affect the deposit supply. In this part, i t  is assumed that the 
individual bank optimizes i ts investment portfol ios and thus, CD and U l ia­
bi l i t ies. Then, based on these optimum values, the bank adjusts i ts FFM 
transactions, borrowings from FRB, excess reserves and/or RP transactions. 
A repurchase agreement (RP) is an arrangement between a commercial bank 
and a corporate f irst to sel l  and then to repurchase a security. RP is a 
secured loan with a f ixed rate of return and maturity. Generally, the 
maturity date on RP's is overnight although term RP's (thirty-days or more) 
are also transacted. A reverse repurchase agreement (RV) is an arrangement 
f i rst to buy and then to resell  a security. RV is the opposite of RP. The 
most common type of securit ies used in RP and RV market are the Treasury 
bi l l  and other USGS's. I f  USGS's are used as col lateral, banks are not 
2The policy of control l ing an optimal combination of a reserve aggre­
gate and the FFR as a short-run instrumental variable to control money sup­
ply, might explain the behavior of FOMC at i ts best. This might be a sub­
ject of future study. 
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required to hold any reserve requirement against RP or RV transactions. 
Overnight RP or RV transactions are the alternatives for FFM transactions. 
The interest rate on overnight RP or RV keeps track of FFR and is usually 
lower than that. 
In this part, Model I I  under LRA from Part I I I  is modif ied as fol lows: 
1) FFR is used as the short-run instrumental variable in contrast to re­
serve aggregates ( i .e., UR^J. 
2) The overnight RP and RV transactions among the banks with USGS as col la­
teral are added as two alternatives to the other short-run portfol ios. 
I t  is assumed that banks withhold RP and RV at the same t ime. The bal­
ance sheet for the banking system can be shown as: 
Assets 
Balance Sheet of Banking System 
Liabil i t ies 
t-2 
TTt-2 
yC\_2 
(jjU t -2 
Reserve total 
Required reserves 
against demand 60 
deposit 
against t ime 
deposit 
against CD 
against EURO 
borrowings 
Surplus 
Excess reserves ER. 
Federal Fund loans FFL^ 
Reverse repurchase RV. 
agreement 
Commercial loans 
Other earning assets 
( investment) 
Miscellaneous assets 
R. 
RR. 
CL. 
MA, 
Demand deposit D^ 
by government 0^ 
by others Dp 
Time deposit T^ 
CD CD^ 
EURO borrowings 
Borrowings 
from FRB B^ 
from FFM FFB^ 
repurchase agreement RP^ 
Miscellaneous l iabi l i t ies MA+ 
Capital CA 
t  
* 
where: = ER^+FFL^+RV^ and ®t'  Bt+FFBt+RPt-
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The other identit ies in the balance sheet are the same as the identit ies 
used for Model I I  under LRA in Part I I I .  
With the same behavioral assumptions as seen in Part I I I ,  the op-
* * * i f  
t imum values CD ,  U ,  I  , and FR for the banking system are found. 
Equation (84) is restated as: 
AI^ = nQAD^+njAT^-nQ|^ACL^-npFR^-npFR^_^+ACD^+AU^-ARR^+ACA^. (93) 
From the balance sheet of the banking system, we derive: 
AD^ :  AFR^-AT^+ACL^-ACD^-AU^+ARR^+AI^+ACA^ 
where 
afr^ = AS^-AB^. 
By substitut ing for AI from equation (93) in the above identity, the re­
sult is: 
Under the system of FFR, as an instrumental variable both UR^ and FR^ are 
endogenously determined in the system. From Appendix I ,  FFM under FFR 
instrument i t  is obtained: 
FR^ = FR(rp,d,rp). 
I t  is also restated: 
FR^ = nl( i ,rp,r%,d). 
Thus, equation (94) can be rewritten as: 
FR^-npFR^-(l-n^)AT^+(l-nç,|_)ACL^-(l-np)FR^_j (94) 
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" l-Hp FRfrp.d.r^)- f îKi ,rp,r j^,d) 
l-n -r- l -nu, l-Hp 
-  6CL,. ^  FR^.J. (.95) 
The expected sign of the coeff icients for the variables can be writ­
ten as fol lows: 
9[AD^] np aFR^ 
Coeff. for i  .  = - Tisr • — i  "
9LAD.] ,  9FR np aPR. 
Coeff. for rp .  - pL .  ^  ,  0 
9[AD.J ,  9FR. Hp 3FR. 
Coeff. for d = * "ad" " Wy '  ~ad~ '  
ambiguous sign which depends on which of the actual or desired free re­
serves are more responsive to change in the discount rate. 
a[AD.] -, 3FR. np 9FR. 
Coeff. for = ar^ ^ "Tn^ * ~ar^ "  "Tr^ '  
ambiguous sign. 
1-nj 
-1 < Coeff. for AT. = -  .  „ < 0 t  1-np -
assuming n^ is actually very small 
l -nri  
0 < Coeff for ACL, = + -r--— < 1 
— t  l-n^ — 
1-np 
-1 < Coeff. for FR. ,  = < 0 
t- i  l-Hg 
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I f  FR^ and FR* are both l inearly approximated, then i t  can be writ ten; 
Hence: 
FR^ = Yo+Yirp+Yzd+YgrR, 
FRt = 
,n _ Yp-npAp ^ ^r"F^l ^ 
t  1-np l-Mg t  l-Mp F^ 
Yp~npAp Yo~1pAo I 'My 
l-Hpi l-Hr 
( 9 6 )  
I t  is known that 
FRt_i = URt-l '^^t- l  
RRt_i = 60^3+ t:T^_2 + YCD^_2 + wU^.g' 
Then, equation (96) is rewritten as: 
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(97) 
Or 
1-n 
UR^ 1 + T-% 
l-t tp 
GDt-3 ^ Vs 
i - " f  
7^Dt-3 (98) 
In equations (97) and (98) we can specify the coeff icients of other 
variables as fol lows: 
-1 < Coeff. for UR. ,  = -  ,  < 0 t-1 i-n^ 
l-np 
0 < Coeff. for RR. ,  = ,  „ < 1 t- i  i-ng 
l-Hp 
0 < Coeff. for D, ? = •. „• • •  6 < 1 t- j  i-ng 
l-np 
0 < Coeff. for T^.3 = ï t^ • X < 1 
l-np 
0 < Coeff. for CD. ^ — y < 1 
u-o i-n^ 
l-np 
0 < Coeff. for g = yrfT" ^ < 1-
1-n F 
D 
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Part I .  Statist ical Problems 
Seasonality 
Any t ime series can be described by the fol lowing components: 
T = Trend: The long-run growth or decline in the t ime series data. 
C = Cycles: The f luctuations in the t ime series with a duration of 2-10 
years (occasionally more). 
I  = Irregular f luctuations: The erratic movements in the t ime series data 
with no regular or recognizable pattern. 
S = Seasonal variat ions: The variat ions in the t ime series with a periodic 
pattern and a duration of one year and less. 
Seasonal variat ions have been modelled by two types of representations: 
1) Addit ive seasonal components -  The magnitudes of seasonal "swings" 
of the t ime series are independent of the average level of the t ime 
series as determined by the trend 
2) Mult ipl icative seasonal components -  The magnitudes of seasonal 
"swings" of the t ime series are proport ional to the average level of 
the t ime series as determined by trend. As the average level of the 
t ime series changes, so do the magnitudes of the seasonal "swings". 
' ' t  '  TfCj.Sj.I ,  .  
In the real world, the variat ions of al l  t ime series are only approxi­
mated by al l  of the above variat ions. When f i t t ing the deposit supply 
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functions result ing from models in Chapter I I I ,  distort ions due to the 
seasonal component may unfold in two ways; 
1) when seasonally unadjusted data are used in the estimations, and 
2 )  when deseasonalized data are used, but different procedures are 
uti l ized for adjustment of the different series. 
The assumption, for the legit imate use of seasonally unadjusted data in 
the estimating procedures, is that the seasonal component in the dependent 
variable is explained by the seasonal components in the independent vari­
ables. I f  the variat ions of the dependent variables are not al l  explained 
by those of the independent variables, dummy variables or tr igonometric 
functions can be used as addit ional explanatory variables. The problem 
with this approach is that i t  is not known whether the seasonal variat ions 
of the dependent variable are ful ly explained by those of the independent 
variables or other dummy or tr igonometric variables. Hence, the false 
inferences about the signif icance of the explanatory variables could re­
sult.  The irregular term would not be normally distr ibuted and would in­
clude the seasonal component. Thus, the estimation of coeff icients of 
explanatory variables would be biased. 
Deseasonalized observations are found by taking out the seasonal 
factor from the original t ime series data which el iminates the seasonal 
effects. This can be accomplished in both frequency and t ime domains. In 
the frequency domain, a certain transformation of the autocovariance func­
t ion of the t ime series is uti l ized. This transformation is called Fourier 
transformation or spectral density function. 
f(w) = E"p(h)p"i ^ 
h = 
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where 
p{h) = autocovariance function of the t ime series 
f(u)) = periodic function of period 2n. 
Therefore, the resultant index is represented in frequencies of various 
tr igonometric functions. The contributions by each of the periodic compo­
nents decomposed by spectral analysis, to the total variance of the t ime 
series would be determined. Thus, the spectral density would identify the 
seasonal (periodic) component. The spectral density of deseasonalized 
data should be approximately equal to the power of the white noise around 
each of the seasonal frequencies. 
For the purpose of deseasonalization in the t ime domain, i f  the t ime 
series has addit ive seasonal variat ions in general, then the l inear re­
gression of the t ime series on dummy variables or tr igonometric functions 
gives better results in terms of smaller seasonal biases.^ I f  the t ime 
series has mult ipl icative variations using the decomposit ion method^ or 
regressing the t ime series on tr igonometric functions., a better performance 
would then result.  The addit ive regression model can be writ ten in a 
l inear form 
3 
^Seasonal bias is measured by the sum of the squared differences be­
tween the observed and predicted values of both historical and future 
data. 
^In a more complex approach X-11 method. 
^Cyclical variat ions are assumed to be absent. 
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where 
' t  = i l  %°j.t 
and 
D. .  = dummy variable j  J > ^ 
= a l inear function for trend variable. 
The seasonal "swings" of a t ime series with addit ive seasonal compo­
nents are independent of the trend function which is described by the 
above model. In a t ime series with mult ipl icative seasonal components, 
the seasonal swings are related to trend of the t ime series which the 
above model is not able to explain. In mult ipl icative decomposit ion 
methods, the moving average of the t ime series is computed using exactly 
one observation from each season. That would el iminate seasonal and 
irregular components and the averaged series would consist of T^XC^. Then, 
i t  fol lows 
Yt 
V^t T^ X • 
By computing the seasonal factor, the seasonal component of the t ime 
series is estimated and deseasonalized data is found by dividing the ob­
servations on by the seasonal factor (see Bowerman and O'Connell (5)). 
Hence, this method does not eff iciently explain a t ime series with addi­
t ive trend, cycle, seasonal components. 
As mentioned, the same deseasonalizing procedure should be ut i l ized 
for adjusting the different series. Otherwise, the seasonal bias in the 
overal l  model may be intensif ied. The effects of the seasonal bias on 
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the estimation results may be dif f icult to recognize. Furthermore, i t  
would be dif f icult to compare the empirical results. I f  al l  the t ime 
series data in a model are deseasonalized by the same procedure, the pro­
cedure should be an optimum one in such a manner that the minimum seasonal 
bias remains in the model. 
For the purpose of deseasonalization, al l  weekly t ime series data 
are regressed on quarterly dummy variables in this study. The reasons 
for this procedure are that, at present, there is not a good seasonal 
adjustment procedure for weekly data of the type employed in this study. 
Secondly, the plots for observations and spectral density functions for 
the key variables indicate spikes reflecting strong quarterly seasonality. 
Thus, quarterly dummies are chosen as a second best, but hopeful ly rea­
sonable way to capture the important seasonal movements in the series. 
Therefore, the variable is regressed on matrix and the residual 
of the regression, e^, is taken as the seasonally adjusted variable. 
where 
and 
and 
\ 
SQ is a column of one's and Sp Sg, and are the quarterly seasonal 
dummies; or 
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1 1 
1 1 
0 0 
13 weeks in the f irst 
quarter 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
13 weeks in the second 
quarter 
13 weeks in the third 
quarter 
f i rst 
year 
1  - 1  - 1  
- 1  - 1  
13 weeks in the fourth 
quarter 
The values of columns in matrix in the f irst year are repeated for 
the second, and subsequent years for the period of the study. Some of the 
variables in the study might have no important seasonal component, but 
the seasonal adjustment on them is justi f ied by the assumption that the 
seasonal dummies are nearly orthogonal. Therefore, in the regression 
equations of these variables, the seasonal dummies have l i t t le or no ex­
planatory power and the residuals are almost equal to the original vari­
ables. In fact, the above adjustment procedure might not be optimal, but 
should be adequate for the purpose of this study. Al l  but two of the vari­
ables in this study were originally not seasonally adjusted. The two 
variables are GNP = Y and GNP price deflator = P. Both were off icial ly 
seasonally adjusted. There were no available data on unadjusted series 
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for these two variables. As mentioned previously, this problem might 
create distort ions due to f i l tering and recognizing the seasonal noise. 
But, for two reasons, this problem is not very signif icant. First, both 
of the above variables do not come into the picture in a single equation 
approach for deposit supply estimation. By ut i l izing only the demand 
deposit equation in a simultaneous equation approach, the above variables, 
Y and P, can have an effect on the deposit supply estimation. Secondly, 
i t  is highly possible that the off icial seasonal adjustment method used 
for the variables, Y and P, is a quarterly seasonal adjustment because 
the original data on Y and P were obtained as quarterly data which are 
interpolated to weekly data. Therefore, a close similarity in off icial 
seasonal adjustment on Y and P and the seasonal adjustment method used 
in this study on other variables is l ikely. 
Serial correlation 
One of the most common assumptions about the disturbance terms in a 
l inear regression equation is that they are independent of one another or 
the covariance of them is zero. In the fol lowing model: 
Y = 3X+U, 
the above assumption implies 
E(UU') = of In 
^ ° for S f  0 
where U = n x 1 matrix of disturbance terms (y^'s). 
The above assumption is not always fulf i l led, especial ly when, as in 
this study, the observations consist of economic t ime series. I t  is often 
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found that the disturbance terms are serial ly correlated. This problem is 
known as "autocorrelation." Incorrect specif ication of a model is one 
cause of the problem in the model. The disturbance terms would ref lect, 
in part, the effect of omitted relevant variables in an equation. There­
fore, in general, any pervasive serial correlation in such variables 
would create a source for the serial correlation in the disturbance terms. 
Measurement error in the "explained" variable is another source of auto­
correlation in a regression equation. 
There exist many dif ferent processes in which the disturbance terms 
can be correlated. The simplest possible type and most common process is 
a f irst-order autoregressive process. The fol lowing relationship then 
holds for the disturbance terms: 
where 
E(ej) = 0 
° for s = 0 
= 0 for s ^ 0. 
is a normally and independently distr ibuted random variable with 
2 
zero mean and constant variance (a e) and zero covariance. p is called 
the f irst order autocorrelation coeff icient. The above process is called 
autoregressive because the current value of U is regressed or expressed 
as a function of the past values of U. I t  is f irst order because only 
one t ime lag for U is used as an explanatory variable in the above process. 
I f  a model includes signif icant serial ly correlated disturbance terms, 
the use of the ordinary least-squares (OLS) method for the estimation 
96 
would result in: (1) a nonvalid test of signif icance for the coeff i­
cients of the explanatory variables and for the performance of the model 
in general, though the estimates for the coeff icients remain unbiased; 
(2) underestimation of variance of the disturbance terms and of the coef­
f icient; and (3) ineff icient estimation and predict ion power for the 
model. However, the OLS estimators remain consistent estimators. 
Assuming a known f irst-order autoregressive process and known value 
forp ,  the use of the generalized least-squares (GLS) method would gen­
erate the best l inear unbiased estimator for the coeff icients of the ex­
planatory variables. Applying GLS method would boi l  down to the fol low­
ing simple approach: f i rst the matrices Y, X, and U are transformed to 
the new variables Y*, X*, and U*, where: Y* = TY, X* = TX, and U* = TU, 
and matrix T is approximated by: 
T  =  - p  1  0  . . .  0  0  0  
0  - p  1  . . .  0  0  U  
0  0  0  . . . - P  1  0  
0  0  0  . . .  U  - p  1  
In the next step, the original relationship, using the transformed var-
ables, is estimated by OLS method. 
In actuali ty, both the exact process of autocorrelation and the value 
of p are unknown, and these need to be estimated. The f irst-order auto­
regressive process for the disturbance terms is considered in Parts I I ,  
I I I ,  and IV. However, the second-order autocorrelation is also tested 
9/ 
for when signif icant f irst-order autocorrelation is found. When the dis­
turbance term fol lows a f irst-order autoregressive process, several ap­
proaches have been mentioned to estimate p. The most accurate, f lexible 
and simple procedure is Durbin's two-stage procedure. By this method, in 
the absence of any lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable 
in the equation, the estimated value of p is obtained by f i t t ing the 
fol lowing equation 
p = the estimated coeff icient for The above equation is obtained 
as fol lows: 
therefore. 
Yt-XtP pY^_^-pX^_^B+e^. 
The calculated value for p would then be substituted for p in T matrix. 
To test the hypothesis that a signif icant degree of f irst-order 
autocorrelation exists in the model, the "d" statist ic by Durbin and 
Watson (D.W. test), in the absence of any lagged dependent variable as 
explanatory variable, is used most frequently. 
n n 
t=l ^ 
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where e^'s are the residual terms obtained from applying OLS in f i t t ing 
the model. Two upper and lower values for d(dy and dj^) for any values 
of n and k are tabulated in most econometrics text books. To test the 
hypothesis of zero f irst-order autocorrelation against the alternative 
of posit ive f irst-order autocorrelation, the hypotheses are: 
HQ :  zero autocorrelation; 
posit ive autocorrelation; 
i f  d < d^, reject HQ ,  accept 
i f  d > dy, fai l  to reject Hg; 
i f  d|^ < d < dy, test is inconclusive. 
Similarly: 
Hg: zero autocorrelation; 
H^: negative autocorrelation; 
i f  4-d < dj^, reject Hg, accept H^; 
i f  4-d > dy, fai l  to reject Hg; 
i f  d^ < 4-d < dy, test is inconclusive. 
When the explanatory variables include one or more lagged dependent 
variables, there is no problem of using OLS method to estimate the model 
and the estimates are unbiased and consistent. However, when lagged 
dependent variables are some of explanatory variables of a model with a 
serial ly correlated disturbance term, then OLS estimates would be in­
consistent. Lagged dependent variables cannot be considered as predeter­
mined and f ixed explanatory variables because the disturbance terms would 
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be correlated with these explanatory variables which violates one of the 
basic assumptions in OLS estimation process. In this case, the D.W. test 
is biased toward the value for random disturbances. 
Therefore, the fol lowing procedures, as suggested by Fair (14) and 
Fuller (18), are chosen as the procedure in this study, to estimate the 
single equation and the simultaneous equation models. In a single equation 
model, one can consider the case of two lagged dependent and one exogenous 
explanatory variables in the equation: 
^t "  
The fol lowing steps are then approached: 
I j  and g regressed on ^ and As a result,  and 
Y^_2 are found. 
2) Y^ is regressed on X^, Y^ and Y^_2> then is found. 
n 
is calculated. 
4) = (Y^, X^, Y^_j, and Y^g) is transformed as 
Z^ for t=l 
= Z^-pZ^_j for t  = 2, 3, n. 
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* * * * 
5) From Gauss-Newton procedure, is regressed on X^, Y^g» 
and 0^2 by OLS approach. 
6) p = p +estimated coeff icient of IJ^_j in step 5 is calculated. 
^c ~ standard deviation of the coeff icient of in step 5 
calculated. 
8) t^ has t  distr ibution; then i f  |t^| > reject the null  
hypothesis of zero autocorrelation; thus, estimators in step 5 should 
be used. I f  | t^| < fai l  to reject HQ .  Hence, the init ial 
OLS estimators should be used. 
In a simultaneous equation model, assuming no identif ication problem, 
i t  can be writ ten 
^t "  *tG+Vt*l+Wt_ia2+Ut 
^t "  
where 
is a matrix of the exogenous variables; 
is a matrix of other endogenous variables in the system; 
is a matrix of one lagged endogenous variable. 
The fol lowing steps then are approached: 
1) and are regressed on X^, X^_j, E^, and As a result,  
and are found (E^ is a matrix for other exogenous variables in 
the system, but not in the equation). 
2) Y^ is regressed on X^, V^, and then 0^ is found. 
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n ^ -
.  t-2 3) p = — is calculated, 
t=2 
4) X^, V^, ^t-1' ^t '  ^t-1^ transformed as: 
Zt =^l-p^ Z^ for t=l 
= Z^-pZ^_^ for t  = 2, 3, . . .» n. 
* * * * 
5) is regressed on X^, V^, W^, and by two-stage-least-squares 
(2SLS) approach. 
6) p = p + coeff icient of 0^^ in step 5 is calculated. 
A 
^c is calculated. 
SE(coeff icient of ^ in step 5) 
8) I f  | t^| > l t^g[j igl> the estimators in step 5 should be used and i f  
|tcl < l^tablel '  init ial 2SLS estimators should be used. 
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Part I I .  Deposit Supply Function under Model I  
Using Lagged Reserve Accounting 
Single equation approach 
Equation (44), the f irst-difference of the deposit supply (AD) equa­
t ion from Model I ,  is estimated in different versions in this part. To 
modify the results, the term RL (reserve release term) is added to the 
equations as an explanatory variable. The term RL shows the effect of 
the changes in required reserve ratios against demand deposits, t ime de­
posits, CDs, and EURO borrowings on AD. Ordinary least-square (OLS) re­
gression is used for estimation. When the disturbance terms are "signif i­
cantly" serial ly correlated, the equations are corrected by using gener­
al ized least-Square (GLS). The values in parentheses are the calculated 
t-values for testing the hypothesis of zero coeff icients. The mult iple 
correlation coeff icient (R ) ,  the standard error (SE), the f irst order 
autocorrelation (p), and the Durbin-Watson statist ic (DW) are l isted for 
each estimation. 
List of variables 
i  = Three months Treasury bi l l  rate 
d = Discount rate 
""s&T ~ Composite rate on t ime and saving deposits 
rp = Federal fund market interest rate 
UR = Unborrowed reserves 
RR = Required reserves 
FR = Free reserves 
T = Time and savings deposits at member banks 
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CD = Cert i f icates of deposit 
TD*^ = The demand component of the money stock 
DG = Government demand deposit at commercial banks 
FD = Foreign deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks 
Float = Float 
CL = Commercial loans 
Y = Gross national product 
P = GNP price deflator 
N = Population 
U = Eurodollar borrowings 
D = Net demand deposits 
IBD^ = Intermember bank deposit 
Dl"^ = Total member bank deposits by nonbank-publ ic and by the 
United States Government 
s = The rat io of 
Dl" 
6 = Required reserve ratio against net demand deposit 
t1 = Composite required reserve ratio against T and CD 
0) = Required reserve ratio against Eurodollar borrowings 
RL = Reserve release^ 
For a detai led description of the above symbols for variables, see 
Appendix I I ,  Data directory. 
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For equation (44) the result ing estimations are shown as: 
(44-1) AD^ = 6.81 + 212.59 i^ - 386.404^ + 1.73 UR^ 
(.057) (0.86) (-2.33) (5.81) 
-  1.61 UR^_j -  0.19AT^ - 0.14T^_^ + 0.19T^_3 
(-5.42) 1-1.93) (-2.12) (2.92) 
+ 1.34ACL^ - 0.16D^_2 - U-01D^_3 + 0.006RL^ 
(6.48) (-2.55) 1-0.18) (0.38) 
R^ = 0.408/ 
SE = 4257138 
p = -0.1846 
DW = 2.3627 
144-2) aD^ = 215.411^ -  390.574^ t  1.72UR^ -  1.61UR^_^ 
(0.87) (-1.24) (5.82) (-5.44) 
- 0.19aT^ -  0.14T^_2 + 0-18T^ _ 3  + 1.35ACL^ 
(-1.97) (-2.17) (2.98) (6.52) 
- 0.16D^ _ 2  - 0.014D^_3 
(-2.54) (-0.22) 
R^ = 0.4091 
SE = 4233005 
p = -0.1837 
DW = 2.3608 
(44-3) AD^ = 8.04 - 347.541^ + 55.42d^ + 2.24UR^ 
(0.06) (-1.40) (0.18) (6.40) 
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- l .«9UR^_j -  0.29AT^ -  5.17(T1T^_2) 
1-5.49) (-2.86) (-3.11) 
+ 4.72(t1T^_3) + 1.48ACL^ -  1.57(60^_2) 
(2.97) (6.88) (-3.88) 
0.b3(6D^_3) + 0.63RL^ 
(1.71) (1.72) 
R^ = .3729 
Sb = 4514943 
p = -0.1120 
DW = 2.2180 
(44-4) aD^ = -345.141^ + 52.45d^ + 2.24UR^ -  1.89UR^_j 
(-1.41) (0.17) (6.47) (-5.54) 
-  0.29AT^ - 5.16(T1T^_2) + 4.71(t1T^_3) 
(-2.87) (-3.11) (2.99) 
+ 1.48ACL^ -  1.57(60^.2) + 0.62(6D^_3) 
(6.89) (-3.92) (1.72) 
+ 0.63RL^ 
(1.73) 
= .3736 
SE = 4501108 
p = -0.1121 
DW = 2.2181 
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Equation (44-1) shows the estimation of equation (44) from Model I  
under LRA in Chapter I I I ,  Part I I ,  using OLS. The signs of the coeff i­
cients are al l  as expected except the coeff icient of D^_2, which is not 
signif icantly different from zero at a 5% level of signif icance. Al l  
variables are regressed on intercept and seasonal dummies as explained in 
Part I ,  Seasonality section of this chapter. Therefore, as expected, the 
intercept term has a very small explanatory power by using deseasonalized 
data in equation (44-1). The estimated coeff icient for RL^ is also in­
signif icantly different from zero which can be explained by the facts 
that the deseasonalized required reserve ratios have almost no variat ion 
during the span of the t ime period of this study. The t ime series plot 
of these ratios supports this hypothesis. 
The derived composite required reserve ratio against T and CD ( i l )  
was the only ratio with a high degree of f luctuations. Due to the lack 
of data on the required reserve ratio against T alone, and against CD 
alone, rat io f i  is uti l ized. This rat io may not show the true variat ion 
of the required reserve ratios and the term RL, to explain the variat ions 
in the dependent variable AD^,. The estimated coeff icients on variables 
i^ and d^ are also not signif icantly different from zero at a 5% level of 
signif icance. However, these two variables and variable are kept 
for later discussion. 
In equation (44-2) the second estimation of equation (44) from Model I ,  
the intercept and RL terms are removed from the explanatory variables. 
The general performance of the estimation is improved by having smaller 
2 
mean square error and larger R .  The estimated coeff icients on 
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variables i^, d^, are st i l l  not signif icantly different from 
zero. 
The implicit  assumption in equation (44-1) and (44-2) is that the 
deseasonalized values of the required reserve ratios are constant during 
the t ime period of this study. Therefore, the coeff icients of variables 
Tt 2» y ^t-2' 0^-3 considered as constant parameters. As 
mentioned before, the t ime series plot of these ratios supports this hypoth­
esis. Equations (44-3) and (44-4) take into account the variat ions ( i f  
any) of these ratios. At f i rst, the equations (44-3) and (44-4) indicate 
a signif icant explanatory power for the variables (t1T^_2), (^IT^^g), 
and (&D^_2). This suggests that the required reserve ratios have some 
explanatory power although their variat ions are small.  Secondly, the 
lagged deposit variables are absent in equations (44-3) and (44-4), 
therefore, the general performance of the estimations is worse than equa­
t ions (44-1) and (44-2) by having a larger SE. Discussed at a later t ime 
are the signs and magnitudes of the estimated coeff icients of variables i  
and d. 
2 Equation (44-2), which has the smallest SE and largest R is chosen 
for further modif ications. The estimated coeff icient for UR has the ex­
pected sign and magnitude. I t  indicates that the increase in the policy 
variable by one dollar would induce deposits to increase by more than one 
dollar which can be expected under the LRA system. The estimated coef­
f icient for UR^_2 is negative and greater than one. I ts sign is as ex­
pected. I ts magnitude in absolute value is greater than one, which might 
suggest n^ is larger than expected. In other words, banks have a rela­
t ively accurate anticipation of their deposit level. The magnitude of the 
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estimated coeff icient of aCL^ also supports the above hypothesis. I ts 
sign is as expected. The increase in demand for the commercial loans 
causes banks to be more aggressive in making investments, thus increasing 
their deposits. The sign and magnitude of aT is as expected. T can be 
considered as an alternative source of deposit funds. Thus, other things 
being the same, as increases, aD would decrease. A prior two week in­
crease in deposits causes the current required reserves to r ise and the 
current demand deposit to fal l .  Conversely, because of a prior three week 
r ise in deposits, the required reserves of one week previous to the current 
week would r ise, which induces ^ to fal l  and aD to r ise. Therefore, 
the signs of variables T^_2, T^^, appear to be as expected. In 
reali ty, the required reserve ratio against demand deposits, on the aver­
age, is greater than the required reserve ratio against t ime deposits. So 
i t  is expected that the magnitude of the estimated coeff icients for 
and D^_2 is larger than those for T^_2 and T^g, respectively. As seen, 
these expectations are not fulf i l led by the estimated coeff icients in 
equation (44-2). On the other hand, the signif icant f irst-order auto­
correlation that existed in the estimation might be responsible for some 
of the above distort ions. 
Equation (44-2) corrected for the f irst-order autocorrelation and 
using GLS procedure, is shown below in equation (44-5). 
(44-5) AD^ = 265.341^ -  444.35d^ + 1.77UR^ -  l.GSUR^^ 
(1.23) (-1.64) (6.02) (-5.61) 
-  0.13AT^ - 0.12T^_2 + 0.17T^_3 + 1.28ACL^ 
(-1.38) (-1.89) (2.73) (6.55) 
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- 0.21D^_2 + 0.03D^_3 -  0.0163e^_^ 
(-3.5; (0.54) (-0.41) 
= 0.4265 
SE = 4091503 
p = 0.0016 
DW = 1.9887 
In equation (44-2) using OLS estimation, p = -0.1837 and DW = 2.3608. 
The DW test could not be ut i l ized because the upper and the lower l imits 
for d statist ics^ are tabulated for no more than 100 observations and 5 
variables. The number of observations in this study is 339. Therefore, 
the signif icance of the estimation for p is tested directly by t-statist ic. 
For this purpose, the residual of OLS estimation (e^) is regressed on i ts 
l a g  ( E ^ _ ^ ) .  T h e  v a r i a b l e s  ( Z ^ )  a r e  t r a n s f o r m e d  a s  -  p Z ^ ^ .  
where p is the estimated coeff icient for the lagged residual. Then, the 
transformed value of the dependent variable is regressed on the transformed 
values of the independent variables and using OLS procedure. The 
better estimator for the f irst-order autocorrelation is found as: 
p = p + Coeff. of ^ in the equation using transformed data. Therefore, 
in equation (44-2), the f irst-order autocorrelation is estimated as p  =  
-0.1837 - 0.0163 = -0.2070. The calculated t-value for p is shown as 
where ^^(E^g) = 0.0574 in the equation using transformed data. As seen 
above, | t |  > 1.96 which indicates a signif icant f irst-order autocorrelation 
^See Part I ,  Serial Correlation Section of this chapter. 
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at a 5% level of signif icance. Therefore, equation (44-5), the corrected 
form for autocorrelation is used instead of equation (44-2). As seen, the 
f irst-order autocorrelation in equation (44-5) is not signif icantly dif­
ferent from zero. Therefore, second-order autocorrelation in equation 
(44-2) is expected to be not signif icantly different from zero. Equation 
2 (44-5) performs better by having a smaller SE and larger R .  On the other 
hand, the estimated coeff icient for D^_2 is not signif icantly different 
from zero, but i ts sign is as expected in equation (44-5). Furthermore, 
the estimated coeff icient for D^_2 is now larger than the estimated coef­
f icient for T^_2' expected. 
Simultaneous equation approach 
The theoretical work in Chapter I I I  concentrates on the determination 
of the deposit supply. In the preceding section of this chapter, the 
theoretical results are tested using the single equation approach. The 
f i rst interest, in this part, is to estimate the same deposit supply 
equation, taking into account the effect of the system of relations in 
which the deposit supply equation is embedded. This aim is accomplished 
by using a simultaneous equation approach. The determination of demand 
for deposit is not studied in this paper. The deposit demand equation for­
mulated by Modigl iani et al.  (30) is used in this part. The second objec­
t ive of using the simultaneous equation approach is to be able to forecast two 
endogenous variables in the money market, namely, demand deposits and 
the interest rate. The system of equations are shown as fol lows: 
I l l  
1) AU^ 
2) TD^ 
3) Dl 'J 
4j TD^ E SDl^-DG^. 
=  ^ t  *  ^ t "  
6) S^Dl'J = S^ X Dl 'J. 
7) AD^ = D^-D^_^. 
The f i rst equation is the f irst difference of the net demand deposit 
supply from model I  under LRA or equation (44-2). The second equation is 
the demand deposit demand equation or the total banking system deposit 
by the nonbank-public and the United States Government. The identity (3) 
shows the definit ional relationship between the net demand deposit supply 
by member banks (D^) and the total member bank deposits by the nonbank-
public and by the United States Government (D^). The identity (4) shows 
the definit ional relationship between TD^ and Dl^L The identit ies (5) 
and (6) show the relationships between new variables in the second equation 
and identity (4), namely iY and SDl^, and variables i ,  Y, S, Dl"^, Identity 
"^'^9°t-2'^^10 t-3* 
^l^tY t*^2rs&T^Yt+03 t^^S^D t-1 
5 D^-IBD'J-Float^+FD^. 
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(7) shows the definit ional relationship between the change and the level of 
the net demand deposit.  The endogenous variables in the above system 
are l isted as aD^, i^, TdJ ,  i^Y^, Dl 'J. S^Dl'J. 
The exogenous variables are shown as 
^t '  URt-1' T^.2' Tt-3' '^t-2' ' "s&Tjf 
^t '  TDt-1' 180%' Floaty, FD^» DG^, S^, 
The term ^ is included in the system when the system of equations is 
corrected for autocorrelation. is the lagged value of the residual 
of the deposit supply equation when 2SLS is used for the above system. 
Taking into account the above system of equations and identit ies, 
equation (44-2) is estimated by using the two-stage-least-square (2SLS) 
procedure. The result is shown below in equation (44-6). 
(44-6) AU = -661.21i^ + 655.49d^ + 1.58UR^ -  1.74UR^_j -  0.27AT^ 
(-1.15) (.94) (5.01) (-5.58) (-2.47) 
-  0.15T._, + 0.19T._. + 1.51ACL. -  0.15D._„ + 0.03L)._„ 
(-2.22) (2.96) (6.51) (-2.25) (0.43) 
= 0.4007 
SE = 4395817 
P = -0.1361 
UW = 2.2630 
Except the estimated coeff icients for i^ and d^, no other signif icant 
changes are obtained by using 2SLS procedure. Using the procedure ex­
plained in Serial Correlation Section of Part I  of this chapter, equation 
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(44-6) is corrected for f irst-order autocorrelation in the context of 
the simultaneous equation approach. The resultant equation is shown in 
equation (44-7). 
(44-7) AD^ = 351.Oli^ -  546.+ 1.76UR^ -  1.61UR^_^ -  O.ISaT^ 
(0.65) (-0.84) (5.81) (-5.29) 1-1.12) 
•0.12T^_2 + 0.17T^_3 + 1.27ACL^-0.21D^_2 
(-1.97) (2.82) (5.58) (-3.26) 
+ 0.02D^_3 - 0.075366^1 
10.28) (-1.19) 
= 0.4209 
SE = 4101025 
p = -0.0064 
DW = 2.0047 
The better estimator for the f irst-order autocorrelation coeff i­
cient for equation (44-6) is found as: 
p = -0.1222 - 0.07536 = -0.1976. 
The calculated t-value for p is shown as: 
^ 0.06319 " -3.1266 
where SE(e^_j^) = 0.06319 in equation (44-7). As seen above, 11| > 1.96 
which indicates a signif icant f irst-order autocorrelation in equation 
(44-6) at a 5% level of signif icance. The f irst-order autocorrelation in 
equation (44-7) is not signif icantly different from zero; thus the second-
order autocorrelation in equation (44-6) is not expected to be 
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signif icantly different from zero. Therefore, equation (44-7) in the cor­
rected form, is used for further analysis. The results are the same, ex­
cept for estimated coeff icients of i  and d. Equation (.44-7) performs bet-
2 ter than equation (44-6) by having lower SE and higher R .  
From the theoretical results of the models in Chapter I I I ,  i t  is ex­
pected that: (1) the coeff icient of i^ be posit ive; (2) the coeff icient of 
d^ be negative; and (3) the coeff icient of i^ be greater than the coeff i­
cient of d^ in absolute value. On the other hand, the FRB's discount rate 
has been considered to be exogenous throughout the study. But, in reali ty, 
the Fed changes the discount rate in part by keeping track of the short-
term money market rates. Therefore, a high correlation between i^ and d.^ 
is expected. The .t ime series plot of variables i^ and d^ supports the 
above hypothesis.^ Moreover, variable d^, the explicit  discount rate, is 
not a good measure for the opportunity cost of not borrowing from the FRB's 
discount window, because a high degree of implicit  costs are involved in 
the borrowing from the FRB. For example, banks become less sound as 
they borrow from the FRB. Thus, in general, i t  is expected that has 
very l i t t le signif icant explanatory power. Finally, another factor which 
is not undertaken by the models in Chapter I I I ,  is the explanatory power 
of the expectations of the interest rates in explaining the variat ions of 
the deposit.  Banks usually base their expectations on the current and 
past values of the variable. Therefore, as i^ increases, banks on one 
hand are encouraged to invest more, hence increasing their deposits in the 
process of investment. On the other hand, an increase in i^ might increase 
iSee Depamphil is (13) and Stigum (37) for more discussion. 
l i b  
their expectations of the future interest rate. Banks would try to econo­
mize by lowering their current investments and deposits. So, as seen, the 
sign of the estimated coeff icient for i^ can be both posit ive and negative. 
In equation (44-2), the signs of the estimated coeff icients for i^ 
and d^ are as expected. The magnitude of the coeff icient for i^ is less 
than the magnitude of the coeff icient for d^ in absolute value, though both 
coeff icients are not signif icantly different from zero. This contradicts 
the theoretical results from Chapter I I I ,  The price in the money market, 
i^, is most l ikely subjected to distort ion by use of a single equation es­
t imation technique instead of simultaneous equations approach. In equa­
t ion (44-5), using a simultaneous equation approach, the estimated coeff i­
cients of i^ and d^ are st i l l  insignif icantly different from zero. More­
over, the signs of the coeff icients contradict the results of models in 
Chapter I I I .  The absence of expectations on the interest rates in the 
model and the other problems mentioned before mgiht explain this contradic­
t ion. In addit ion, the functional form of the demand for demand deposit 
might be another reason for this behavior. The functional form TD*^ is not 
analyzed in this study. When equation (44-6) is corrected for f irst-order 
autocorrelation in equation (44-7), the estimated coeff icients for i^ and 
d^ have correct signs according to the results of the models in Chapter 
I I I .  The magnitudes are st i l l  incorrect. Both variables show l i t t le or 
no explanatory power compared to the large and signif icant explanatory 
powers of the policy variable and the lagged exogenous variables.^ 
^The functional form expressed in equation (44) of model 1 under LRA 
is used to estimate the level of the deposit supply using no unity 
(Footnote continued on fol lowing page). 
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constraints on the coeff icient of the one lagged deposit supply as an ex­
planatory variable. The results are shown below: 
(1) Using OLS: 
= 4.81 + 335.07i. -  523.82d^ + 1.66UR^ -  1.5UR^^^ 
(0.04) (1.37) (-1.69) (b,71) (-5.12) 
-  O.l lAl^ -  0.15T^_2 + 0.2T^.3 + 1-3ACL^ 
(-1.12) (-2.36) 13.27) (6.16) 
+ 0.83D^_^ -  0.003D^_2 -  O.OSD^,] 
(18.61) (-0.04) 1-0.49) 
R^ = 0.9715 
SE = 4072415 
p = -0.0320 
DW = 2.0561 
2) Using GLS for testing and correcting the f irst-order autocorrelation; 
= -5.16 + 321.63i^ - 508.66d. + 1.71UR^ - 1.55UR^_^ 
1-0.05) (1.34) (-1.69) (5.81) (-5.25) 
-  O.IIaT^ -  0.14Tt_2 + 0.19T^_3 + 1.27ACL^ + 0.88D^_j 
l - l . l )  (-2.18) (3.06) (6.25) (12.45) 
-  0.06D^_2 - 0.0ZDt_3 - U.0307826^ ^ 
(-0.66) 1-0.3) 1-0.3399) ISECe^^^) = 0.09055). 
= U.9747 
SE = 4085873 
p = O.U009 
DW = 1.9896 
A better estimator for p is p = -0.056947-0,030782 = -0.0877 and 
t  = ~o'090550 = -0.9688; thus | t |  < 1.96. The f irst-order autocorrela­
t ion in equations using OLS is not signif icantly different from zero. 
(Footnote continued on following page). 
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3) Using 2SLS and using the demand equation for the demand deposit 
ut i l ized in this part: 
= 5.27 + 577.43i^ -  812,7d^ + 1,7UR^ -  1.46UR^_^ 
(0.04b) (1,27) (-1.31) 15.67)  ( -4 .84)  
- 0.09AT^ -  0.15T^_2 + 0.21T^_3 + 1.21ACL^+ 0.82D^_^ 
(-0.79) (-2.33) 13.26) (5.42) (17.98) 
-  0.002D^ _ 2  - 0.04D^_3 
(-0.022) (-0.64) 
= 0.y715 
5E = 4004735 
p  = -0 .0268 
UW = 2.0458 
4) Using the procedure explained in Serial Correlation Section of Part I  
of this chapter, the above equation is tested and corrected for the 
f irst-order autocorrelation in the context of simultaneous equation 
approach. 
= -2.69 + 458.66i^ -  673.36d^ + 1.75UR^ -  1.56UR^_j 
(-0.U25} (0.96) (-1.17) (b.8) (-5.15) 
-  U.09AT^ -  0.14T^_2 + 0.19T^_3 + 1.24ACL^ + 0.85D^_j 
(-0.87) (-2.12) (3.01) (5.6) (12.03) 
-  U.03D^_2 -  U.0ZDt_3 + U.0b8246e^_^ (bE(e^_^) = 0.089865). 
(-0.3) (-0.36) (0.65) 
= 0.9769 
Sh = 4087777 
p  = -0.0115 
DW = 2.0149 
A better estimator for P is p = -0.108435 + 0.058246 = -0,0502 and 
t  = ' 'q'o8^Q55 ~ -0.5585; thus | t |  < 1.96. The f irst-order autocorrela­
t ion in the equation using 2SLS is not signif icantly different fràm zero. 
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Part I I I .  Deposit Supply Function Under Model I I  
Using Lagged Reserve Accounting 
Single equation approach 
Equation (92) the f irst-difference of the deposit supply (AD) equation 
from Model I I  under LRA is estimated in this part. The term RL is added 
to the other explanatory variables. The estimation procedures used in 
this part are the same as the procedures used in Part I I  of this chapter. 
The result ing estimations for equation (92) are shown as: 
(92-1) AD^ = 50.89 + 167.13i^ -  572.09d^ + 1.70UR^ -  1.69UR^_^ 
(0.43) (0.65) (-1.5) (5.75) (-5.69) 
-  0.14AT^ -  0.41T^_2 + 0.45T^_3 + 1.25ACL^ 
(-1.29) (-3.11) (3.37) (5.72) 
-  0.17D^_2- 0.01D^_3 + 0.40CD^_2 -  0.37CD^_3 
(-2.75) (-0.2) (2.59) (-2.35) 
+ 0.005U^_2 •  0.02UT_3 + 0.004RL^ 
( 0 . 0 2 )  ( - 0 . 1 )  ( 0 . 2 8 )  
R^ = 0.4268 
SE = 4178256 
p = -0.1986 
DW = 2.3911 
(92-2) AD^ = 166.861^ -  567.28d. + 1.7UR^ -  1.69UR^_j^ 
(0.65) (-1.49) (5.77) (-5.71) 
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- 0.13AT^ -  0.41T^_2 + 0.45TT_3 + 1.25ACL^ 
(-1.27) (-3.10) (3.37) (5.75) 
- 0.17D^_2 -  0.01Dt_3 + 0.4CD^_2 -  0.36CD^_3 
(-2.77) (-0.22) (2.59) (-2.36) 
+ 0.0004U^_2 -  0.02U^_3 
(0 .002)  ( -0 .08)  
= 0.4270 
SE = 4155738 
p = -0.1989 
DW = 2.3917 
(92-3) AD^ = 164.221t - 602.81d^ + 1.71UR^ - 1.68UR^_j - 0.14AT^ 
(0.64) (-1.66) (5.83) (-5.72) (-1.46) 
- 0.42T^_2 + 0.45T^_3 + 1.28ACL^ - 0.17D^_2 
(-3.3) (3.56) (6.21) (-2.77) 
- 0.01D^_3 + 0.4CD^_2 -  0.37CD^_3 
(-0.17) (2.66) (-2.41) 
R^ = 0.4268 
SE = 4131545 
p = -0.1955 
DW = 2.2181 
(92-4) AD^ = 8.23 - 519.271^ + 325.37d + 2.24UR^ - 1.83UR^_j 
(0.06) (-2) (0.83) (6.11) (-4.81) 
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- 0.28AT^ -  11.37(T1T^_2) + 11.33(t1T^_3) 
(-2.68) (-3.31) (3.36) 
+ 1.46ACL. - 1.59(60+ p) + 0.5(60. _) 
(6.77) (-3.5) (1.09) 
+ 8.48(T1CD^_2) -  9.25(T1CD^_3) + 1 . 0 e { d i ^ _ 2 ^  
(2.13) (-2.3) (.56) 
- O.l(a)LI^_0) + 0.5RL^ 
(-0.14) (1.09) 
= 0.3852 
SE = 4481587 
p = -0.1081 
DW = 2.2085 
(92-5) aD^ = -  517.Oli^ + 323.34d^ + 2.24UR^ -  1.83UR^_^ 
(-2.02) (0.83) (6.16) (-4.85) 
- 0.27AT^ - 11.36(t1T^_2) + 11.31(t1T^_3) 
(-2.68) (-3.32) (3.38) 
+ 1.46ACL^ - 1.59(6Dt_2) + 0.5(60^3) 
(6.78) (-3.52) (1.09) 
+ 8.47(t1CD^_2) -  9.25(T1CD^_3) + 1.06(a)U^_2) 
(2.13) (-2.3) (0.56) 
- 0.11(uU^_3) + 0.5RL^ 
(-0.15) (1.09) 
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= 0.3859 
SE = 4467685 
p = -0.1082 
DW = 2.2085 
(92-6) aD^ = - 17.03 -  333.531% + 40.37d% + 2.17UR% - 181UR%_^ 
(-0.13) (-1.44) (.13) (5.95) (-4.82) 
-  0.3161% - 2.31(t1T%_2 +T1CD%_2) 
(-3.04) (-2.41) 
+ 2.03(t1T%_3 + T1CD%_3) + 1.52ACL% 
(2.15) (7.06) 
-  1.48(60. 9) + 0.5(6DL q) + 1.23(wU, ;)  
( -3 .24)  (1 .1)  (0 .65)  
- 0.15(ioU%_3) + 0.51RL% 
( - 0 . 2 )  ( 1 . 1 1 )  
R^ = .3689 
SE = 4571850 
P = -0.1141 
DW = 2.2222 
(92-7) AD% = -336.811% + 41.96d% + 2.17UR% - 1.81UR%_^ 
(-1.46) (0.13) (5.97) (-4.88) 
-  0.31AT% - 2.32(T1T%_2 + TlCD%_2) 
(-3.07) (-2.42) 
+ 2.05(t1T%_3 + T1CD%_3) + 1.52ACL% - 1.47(6D%_2) 
(2.2) (7.07) (-3.25) 
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+ 0.51(60+ O) + 1.22(WU. P) -  0.14(WU. ,)  + 0.51RL. 
(1 .12)  " (0 .65)  " ( .0 .19)  " (1.13)  
= 0.3696 
SE = 4557950 
p = -0.1139 
DW = 2.2219 
Equations (92-1) and (92-2) show two versions of the estimations for 
equation (92) from Model I I  under LRA in Part I I I  of Chapter I I I .  The 
version with no intercept and RL term gives a better performance. The 
signs of the estimated coeff icients on the explanatory variables are as 
expected, except for variables CD^_2> U^_2» and The 
estimated coeff icients on the variables ^t-3' AT^, i^ and d^ 
are not signif icantly different from zero. Equation (92-3) shows the es­
t imation of the result ing equation from Model I I  under LRA with the in­
clusion of only CD to the Model I .  Equation (92-3) indicates a better 
performance in explaining aD^ than equation (92-2). Except for the esti­
mated coeff icients on CD^_2 and CD^_2 and D^_3> the other coeff icients 
have the expected signs. Equations (92-4) and (92-5) show the estimations 
for equation (92) taking the variat ions of the deseasonalized required re­
serve ratios into account. As mentioned before, t1 is the composite rat io 
for the required reserves against the t ime deposit and CD. To correct the 
measurement errors in variables t1T^_2, t1T^_3, r lCD^^g, and TlCD^^g, the 
required reserve against total t ime deposit including CD, namely (t lT^_2+ 
t1CD^_2) and are used as the explanatory variables in 
equations (92-6) and (92-7). 
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Equations (92-2) and (92-3) which have smaller SE and larger r2 than 
the other estimations are chosen for further modifications. In both equa­
t ions, the signs of the estimated coefficients for CD contradict the re­
sults of the theory in Model I I  under LRA. The way that CD is integrated 
into Model I I  under LRA channels the effect of the change in the outstand­
ing level of CD upon the deposit supply through the change in the banking 
reserves. But the confl icting results on the signs of the coefficients for 
CD^ 2 0*^ CD^_2 might suggest that addit ional direct effects by the lagged 
CD's on the f irst difference of the deposit supply exist. Model I I  under 
LRA has not considered these effects. 
Equations (92-7) and (92-8) show the corrected form of equations 
(92-2) and (92-3) for the f irst-order autocorrelation, respectively. 
(92-7) AD^ = 243.48i^ - 586.55d^ + 1.72UR^ - 1.72UR^_^ 
(1.11) (-1.83) (5.9) (-5.9) 
- 0.04AT^ - 0.34T^_2 + 0.38T^_3 + 1.13ACL^ 
(-0.35) (-2.81) (3.15) (5.5) 
- 0.230^2 + O.OSD^G + 0.35CD^_2 - 0.32CD^_3 
(-3.82) (0.44) (2.53) (-2.29) 
+ 0.0008U^_2 - 0-54U^_3 - 0.032793e^_j 
(0.003) (-0.21) (-0.56) 
R^ = .4509 
SE = 3977061 
p  = .0022 
DW = 1.9883 
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From equation (92-2) p = -0.1996-0.032793 = -0.2324, and 
t  = -3-9582 
where SE(e^_j) = 0.058702 in equation (92-7). As seen above, | t |  > 1.96 
which shows a signif icant f irst-order autocorrelation at a 5% level of 
signif icance for equation (92-2). The f irst-order autocorrelation in 
equation (92-7) is not signif icantly different from zero. The second-
order autocorrelation in equation (92-2) is not expected to be signif i­
cantly different from zero. Therefore, equation (92-7) is used instead of 
2  (92-2) with a better performance in terms of smaller SE and larger R .  
(92-8) AD. = 233.72i^ -  680.724^ + 1.75UR^ -  1.71UR^_j -  0.076aT^ 
(1.06) (-2.21) (6.04) (-5.91) (-0.8) 
-  0.36T^_2 + 0.4T^_3 + 1.21ACL^ -  O.ZSD^g 
(-3.11) (3.42) (6.3) (-3.78) 
+ 0.04D^_3 + 0.36CD^_2 -  0.33CD^_3 -  0.027162e^_^ 
(0.6) (2.67) (-2.38) (-0.47) 
r2 = 0.4484 
SE = 3967457 
p = 0.0051 
DW = 1.9826 
From equation (92-3) p = -0.1962-0.027162 = -0.2234, and 
t = 'o!057747 " -3'868 
where SE(e^_^) = 0.057747 in equation (92-8). Thus, | t |  > 1.96, which 
125 
shows a signif icant f irst-order autocorrelation at a 5% level of signif i­
cance for equation (92-3). The second-order autocorrelation for equation 
(92-3) is not expected to be signif icantly different from zero. As seen 
above, the f irst-order autocorrelation for equation (92-8) is not signif i­
cantly different from zero. Therefore, equation (92-8) is chosen instead 
of equation (92-3) which has a better performance in terms of smaller SE 
and larger R^. 
In both equations (92-7) and (98-8), signs of the estimated coeffi­
cients are as expected except for the coefficients for variables 
CDt_3' ^t-2' ^t-3' 
Simultaneous equation approach 
As in Part I I  of this chapter, equations (92-2) and (92-3) 
are reestimated by use of 2SLS procedure, taking into account the same 
functional form for the demand for deposit as uti l ized in Part I I  of this 
chapter. The system of equations used in 2SLS procedure is the same as 
the system presented in Part I I  except that the deposit supply equation is 
replaced by equation (92-2) and then (92-3). 
For equation (92-2) the result is shown below in equation (92-9). 
(92-9) AD^ = - 707.31i^ + 532.82d^ + 1.57UR^ - 1.8UR^_j - 0.2AT^ 
(-1.19) (0.69) (5.08) (-5.83) (-1.77) 
- 0.5T^_2 + 0.54T^_3 + 1.4ACL^ - O.ieO^g + O.OSD^g 
(3.44) (3.69) (5.85) (-2.55) (0.44) 
+ 0.51CD^_2 - 0.49CDt_3 - 0.03U^_2 + O.OlU^ g  
(2.98) (-2.79) (-0.12) (0.06) 
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r2 = 0.4194 
SE = 4306457 
p = -0.1474 
DW = 2.2844 
Using the simultaneous equation approach, equation (92-3) is reestimated 
in equation (92-10) below. 
(92-10) aD^ = - 908.24i^ + 758.846^ + 1.55UR^ - 1.82UR^_^ 
(-1.48) (0.95) (4.97) (-5.87) 
- 0.23AT^ - 0.52T^_2 + + 1.45ACL^ 
(-2.06) (-3.71) (3.95) (6.33) 
- 0.16D^ _ 2  + 0.040^2 + 0.53CD^_2 " 0.51CD^_2 
(-2.5) (0.62) (3.14) (-2.95) 
R^ = 0.4157 
SE = 4357480 
p = -0.1261 
DW = 2.2406 
With the same procedure uti l ized in Part I I ,  equation (92-9) is corrected 
for the f irst-order autocorrelation in the context of the simultaneous 
equation approach. The result is shown below in equation (92-11). 
(92-11) AD^ = 368.57i^ - 748d^ + 1.73UR^ - 1.7UR^_^ - 0.03AT^ 
(0.66) (-1.05) (5.77) (-5.64) (-0.25) 
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-  0.34T. p + 0.38T. ~ + 1.12ACL. -  0.23D. .  
(-2.;;) (2.76) (4.78) (_3.g6) 
+ 0.014D^_3 + 0.34CD^_2 - O.SCD^ g  - 0.02U^ _ 2  
(0.22) (2.15) (-1.89) (-0.06) 
- 0.04U^_3 - 0.067264Gt_i 
(-0.14) (-1.06) 
= 0.4454 
SE = 3988983 
p = -0.0056 
DW = 2.0044 
From equation (92-9) p = -0.157186-0.067264 = -0.2245, and 
•f-  -  ~0'2245 _ o coy 
^ ~ 0.063457 
where SE(e^_j^) = 0.063457 in equation (92-11). The f irst-order autocorre­
lation is signif icantly different from zero at a 5% level of signif icance. 
The second-order autocorrelation is not expected to be signif icantly dif­
ferent from zero. Therefore, equation (92-11) is used instead of equation 
p (92-9) because of a smaller SE and a larger R .  
Similarly, the corrected form for autocorrelation of equation (92-10) 
is shown below in equation (92-12). 
(92-12) aD^ = 440.81i^ - 942.13d^ + 1.75UR^ - 1.66UR^_^ - 0.06AT^ 
(0.75) (-1.26) (5.88) (-5.5) (-0.54) 
- 0.35T^_2 + 0.39T^_3 + 1.18ACL^ - 0.22D^_2 
(-2.65) (2.9) (5.31) (-3.57) 
).01D^ _ 3  + 0.34CD^_2 - 0.3CD^_3 - 0.087618e ^  
(0.24) (2.17) (-1.87) (-1.35) 
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= 0.4417 
SE = 3985969 
p  = -0.0015 
DW = 1.9965 
From equation (92-10) p  = -0.129366-0.087618 = -0.217, and 
^ " 0!06506 ^ -3-3351 
where 
SE(et-i) = 0.06506 in equation (92-12). 
The f irst order autocorrelation is signif icantly different from zero 
at a 5% level of signif icance. The second-order autocorrelation is not 
expected to be signif icantly different from zero. Therefore, equation 
(92-12) is used instead of equation (92-10) because of a smaller SE and 
2 
a larger R .  
The endogenous variables in the system of simultaneous equations are 
the same in all cases. 
The exogenous variables in the system including equation (92-2) are 
shown below. 
^t '  URt' URt-i '  ATt' Tt-2' ^t-3' °t-2' °t-3' ^S&T^t' 
h-  Vf Sf "t-r =°t-2' 
CDt_3' ^t-2' ^t-3' ^t-r 
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The exogenous variables in the system including equation (92-3) are 
shown below. 
dt» UR^, AT^, Tt-2' Vs' °t-2' °t-3' ""S&Tjt '  
Y^, N^P^, TD^_^, IBD'J, Floaty, FD^, DG^, S^, 
CD^_2' ^t-r ^ 
iThe functional form expressed in equation (92) of Model I I  under 
LRA is used to estimate the level of the deposit supply using no unity 
constraints on the coefficient of the one lagged deposit supply as an 
explanatory variable. Using OLS, the results are shown below. 
= 299.19i^ - 634.Id^ + 1.62UR^ - 1.59UR^_j - O.OlAT^ 
(1.19) (-1.71) (5.61) (-5.47) (-0.11) 
0.44Tt_2 + 0-48T^_3 + l. lACL^ - 0.0020^,2 - 0.040^,3 
(-3.4) (3.73) (50.8) (-0.03) (-0.62) 
+ 0.81D^ _ j  + 0.41CD^_2 - 0.38CD^_3 - 0.19U^_2 + 0-12U^ _ 3  
(17.94) (2.7) " (-2.49) (-0.75) (0.5) 
R^ = 0.9730 
SE = 3955316 
p = -0.0406 
DW = 2.0750 
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Part IV. Deposit Supply Function under Model I I I  
Using Lagged Reserve Accounting 
Single equation approach 
Equation (98), the f irst-difference of the deposit supply (aD) equa­
t ion from Model I I I  under LRA, is estimated in this part. The estimation 
procedure used in this part is the same as the procedures used in Parts 
I I  and I I I . 
For equation (98) the result ing estimations are shown as: 
(98-1) = -5.55 + 254.43i^ - 7.22d^ - 212.63rp 
(-0.04) (0.88) (-0.01) (-1.08)^ 
- 0.21aT^ + 1.54ACL^ - 0.21UR^_^ + 0.04T^_3 
(-1.88) (6.92) (-1.46) (3.18) 
- 0.19D^_3 + 0.03CD^_3 - O.l lU^,] + O.OIRL^ 
(-5.05) (1.29) (-1.66) (0.37) 
R^ = 0.35 
SE = 4706362 
p = -0.2012 
DW = 2.4007 
(98-2) aD^ = 256.56i. - 17.65d^ - 120.ISR^ - 0.21aT^ 
(0.89) (-0.03) (-1.08)* (-1.94) 
+ 1.55aCL^ - 0.21UR^_^ + 0.04T^_3 - 0.190^,3 
(6.99) (-1.46) (3.26) (-5.10) 
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+ 0.03CD^_3 - O.l lU^g 
(1.32) (-1.65) 
= 0.3468 
SE = 4679540 
p = -0.2000 
DW = 2.3982 
(98-3) aD^ = 153.25 - 417.591^ + 1492.55d^ - 630.21rp 
(1.14) (-1.42) (3.17) (-2.81) ^ 
- 0.37AT^ + 1.74ACL^ - 0.93UR^_j + 1.89(T1T^_3) 
(-3.42) (8.01) (-2.62) (2.71) 
+ 0.29(60+ .) - 0.54(T1CD. ,) + 0.56(A)U. .) 
(0.71) (-0.85) (0.35)' 
+ 0.29RL^ 
(0.73) 
R^ = 0.3102 
SE = 4966236 
P = -0.1133 
DW = 2.2231 
(98-4) AD^ = - 427.671 + 1328.75d^ - 525.46rp - 0.36AT^ + 1.74ACL^ 
(-1.46)* (3.23) (-3.17Ï (-3.33) (8) 
- 0.67UR^_j + 1.53(t1T^_3) - 0.01(60^,3) - 0.61(T1CD^_3) 
(-4.81) (3) (-0.5) (-0.97) 
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-  0.05(wU._.)  
( -0 .08)  
= .3080 
SE = 4957532 
p = -0.1152 
DW = 2.2273 
Equations (98-1) and (98-2) show the estimations of equation (98) 
from Model I I I  under LRA in Chapter I I I , Part IV, using OLS. All vari­
ables are regressed on intercept and seasonal dummies. Hence, the inter­
cept term has a very small explanatory power in equation (98-1). The 
deseasonalized required reserve ratios have almost no variation during 
the span of the time period of this study. Thus, the estimated coeffi­
cient for RL^ is also insignif icantly different from zero in equation 
(98-1). Therefore, equation (98-2) is formulated by elimination of the 
intercept and RL^ terms from equation (98-1). Equations (98-3) and (98-4) 
show the estimations of equation (98) taking into account the variations 
of the required reserve ratios. In Part I I ,  more explanation is presented 
about these versions of the estimations. Equation (98-2) with the lowest 
SE is chosen for further analysis. As noticed in the estimation (98-2) 
compared to equation (98) in Part IV of Chapter I I I , variable r^^p ,  the 
RP market interest rate, is eliminated. There are no available time 
series data on this variable. On the other hand, rpp keeps track of 
FFR or rp very closely. Therefore, r^ alone can explain the variations 
'"t ""t 
of rj;^p by i ts variation. Hence, this problem is not of signif icance. 
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Except for the signs of the estimated coefficients for D^_2 and the 
other variables have the expected signs. Under Model I I I  using LRA, the 
policy variable is rv ,  however, as seen in estimation (98-2) i ts coef-
•"t 
f icient is not signif icantly different from zero. 
Equation (98-2) corrected for the f irst-order autocorrelation using 
GLS approach, is shown below in equation (98-5). 
(98-5) AD^ = 334.79i^ - 209.62d^ - 140.SBr^ - 0.06AT^ + 1.32ACL^ 
(1.37) (-0.49) (-0.86)t (-0.58) (6.16) 
- 0.16URt_i + 0.04T^_3 - 0.2D^_3 + 0.029CD^_3 
(-1.30) (4.05) (-6.45) (1.54) 
-  0.12U^_3 -  0.024521e^_^ 
(-2.17) (-0.43) 
(SE(e^_^) = 0.056727) 
R^ = 0.3728 
SE = 4486496 
p = -0,0052 
DW = 2.0071 
From equation (98-2) p = -0.199959 -  .024621 = -0.2246, and 
t  = "o." 056727 = -3-959-
As seen above, | t |  > 1.96; hence, a signif icant f irst-order auto­
correlation at a 5% level of signif icance exists in equation (98-2). 
The second-order autocorrelation in equation (98-2) is expected to be 
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not signif icantly different from zero. Equation (98-5) in the corrected 
2 form, with smaller SE and larger R is uti l ized for further analysis. 
Simultaneous equation approach 
Equation (98-2) is reestimated using the system of simultaneous equa­
t ions. The system of the equations are the same as the ones uti l ized in 
Part I I ,  except that the deposit supply equation is replaced by equation 
(98-2). 2SLS is used as an estimation procedure. The endogenous variables 
seen are the same as those in Model I  under LRA in Part I I  of this chapter. 
The exogenous variables are as fol lows: 
^ t '  URt_i, ATt' ^t-3' '"s&Tjf 
TDt-1' 180%, Floaty, FD^, DG^, S^, D^_^, CD^_2, U^_3, e^_^. 
The term e.  , is included in the system when the system of equations is t- 1 
corrected for autocorrelation. is the lagged value of the residual 
of the deposit supply equation when 2SLS is used in the above system. 
Taking into account the above system, equation (98-2) is reestimated 
in equation (98-6). 
(98-6) AD^ = - 1199.04i^ + 929.69d^ + 184.78rp - 0.28AT^ + 1.7ACL^ 
(-1.46) (1.29) (0.64)t (-2.35) (6.98) 
- 0.47URt_i + 0.049T^_3 - O.lSD^.g + 0.023CD^_3 
(-2.33) (3.47) (-2.71) (0.94) 
- 0.056U^_3 
(-0.77) 
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= 0.3316 
SE = 5049597 
p = -0.1063 
DW = 2.2068 
Using the procedure explained in Part I ,  Serial Correlation Section 
of this chapter, equation (98-6) is corrected for the f irst-order auto­
correlation in the context of simultaneous equation approach. The result 
is shown in equation (98-7). 
(98-7) AD^ = - 264i^ + 225.54d^ - 5.54RP - 0.13AT^ 
(-0.38) (0.35) (-0.02% (-1.038) 
+ 1.45ACL^ - 0.27URt_i + 0.05T^_3 - 0.18D^_3 
(5.96) (-1.51) (3.94) (-4.13) 
+ 0.03CD^_3 - 0.1U^_3 - 0.04e^_J 
(1.3) (-1.6) (-0.63) 
(SE(et-i) = 0.067731) 
R^ = .3609 
SE = 4579039 
P = -0.0123 
DW = 2.0200 
From equation (98-6), p = -0.144692-0.042439 = -0.1871 and 
^ ^ 0.067731 ^ -2-7629. 
| t |  > 1.96 suggests that the f irst-order autocorrelation exists in equa­
t ion (98-6) and signif icantly differs from zero at a 5% level of 
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signif icance. The second-order autocorrelation is not expected to be sig-
nigicantly different from zero in equation (98-6). Therefore, equation 
(98-7) is uti l ized for further analysis instead of equation (98-6). The 
SE of equation (98-7) is smaller and i ts R is larger than equation (98-6). 
In equation (98-7), the signs of the coefficients for i^, and 
U^_2 contradict the results from Model I I I  under LRA, but the other signs 
are as expected. The problem in equation (98-7) is that most of the vari­
ables are not signif icantly different from zero. This problem is also 
seen in equation (98-5). I t  means that in Model I I I  under LRA, some of the 
important explanatory variables which explain the variation of AD^ have 
been eliminated. Appearance of the three highly correlated explanatory 
variables, namely i^, d^, rp ,  might be another explanation for the poor 
performance of Model I I I  under LRA. Simple correlation coefficients for 
the above three variables are as follows: 
Simple correlation coefficient of.( i^, d^) = 0.89557; 
Simple correlation coefficient of ( i . ,rr ) = 0.9316; 
^ ""t 
Simple correlation coefficient of (d.,rp ) = 0.8939.1 
^ ""t 
iThe functional form expressed in equation (98) of Model I I I  under LRA 
is used to estimate the level of the deposit supply using no unity con­
straints on the coefficient of the one lagged deposit supply as an explana­
tory variable. The results are shown below. 
1) Using OLS: 
= 63.61 + 349.151^ + 1112.43d^ - 1049.09rp - 0.44AT^ + 1.93ACL^ 
(0.51) (1.35) (3.77) (-4.58) ^ (-4.11) (9.06) 
- 0.79FR^_j + 0.97Dt_i 
(-2.52) (82.64) 
R^ = 0.9643 p = -0.0641 
SE = 5071753 DW = 2.1254 
(Footnote continued on following page). 
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(Footnote continued from preceding page). 
2) Using GLS for testing and correcting for the f irst-order autocorrelation 
= 35.95 + 368.33i+ + 855.77d^ - 940.9RP - 0.43AT^ 
(0.24) (1.24) (2.36) (-3.59)* (-3.9) 
+ 1.94 aCL^ - 0.67FRT_I + 0.99D^_^ - 0.234G02E^^J 
(8.96) (-1.9) (59.14) (-3.61) 
(SE(e^_j) = 0.06486) 
= 0.9515 p = 0.0058 
SE = 5086442 DW = 1.9878 
A better estimator for p is p = +0.150409-0.234002 = -0.0836 and t  = 
'  '0'06486 ~ ~1-2888; thus | t |  < 1.96. The f irst-order autocorrelation 
in equation using OLS is not signif icantly different from zero. 
3) Using 2SLS uti l izing the demand equation for the demand deposit used in 
this part: 
= 50.65 + 2912.81i^ + 350.22d^ - 2417.15RP - 0.38AT^ 
(0.35) (4.14) (0.91) (-5.62) * (-3.1) 
+ 1.77 aCL^ - 1.57FR^_j + 0.97D^_^ 
(7.2) (-3.83) (72.58) 
R^ = 0.9542 p = 0.1426 
SE = 6592422 DW = 1.7060 
4) Using the procedure explained in Serial Correlation Section of Part I  of 
this chapter, the above equation is tested and corrected for the f irst-
order autocorrelation in context with the simultaneous equation approach. 
= 53.88 + 2923.97i. + 219. 4 8 d ^  - 2330.32RP - 0.33 aT^ 
(0.39) (4.34) (0.58) (-5.65) * (-2.59) 
+ L66 aCL^ - 1.47FR^_j + 0.97D^_j -  0.012081e^_j 
(6.61) (-3.69) (75.99) (-0.19) 
(SE(e^_j) = 0.064795) 
A better estimator for p is p = -0.061863-0.012081 = -0.0739 and 
t  = " q ' 0 5 4 7 9 5  = -1.1412; thus | t |  < 1.96. The f irst-order autocorrela­
t ion in the equation using 2SLS, is not signif icantly different from 
zero. 
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Part V. Simulation 
To test the abil i ty of the models to generate the historical values 
of the key variables, namely i  and D, a Gauss-Seidel simulation technique 
is uti l ized. 
The system of simultaneous equations under Model I  including equation 
(44-7) and corrected for autocorrelation is selected for the purpose of 
simulation. This system is shown below: 
1) AD* = 351.Oli* - 546.5d* + 1.76UR* - 1.61UR*_j 
- 0.13&T* - 0.12T*_2 + 0.17T*_3 + 1.27ACL* 
- 0.210* 2 0'02D*_3 - 0.07536e^_^. 
2) TdJ = - 0.00029(i^Y^) + 0.0033(rg%y Y^) + 0.03Y^ - 0.0016(N^P^) 
+ 0.87TDJ_^ .  
3) Dl'J H - IBD'J -  Floaty + FD^. 
4) TDJ 5 S^Dl'J -  DG^. 
5) i^Yt E i tXYf 
6) S^Dl'J = X Dl'J. 
7) AD^ -
8) AD* E AD^ + 0.122AD^_^. 
\ ^ \ 0.122i^_j 
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10) 0^ 2 - 0^-2 0.122D^_2. 
11) 0^-3 = Dt_3 + 0.122Dt_ 4 .  
The variables with superscripts (*) are the transformed variables for 
autocorrelation correction, where p = -0.122, is the value used for trans­
forming the values of the variables. 
The above system can be solved and reduced to a system of six equa­
t ions and identit ies: 
1) = 351.Oli^ + 42.82i^_J - 546.5d* + 1.76UR^ -  1.16UR*_^ -  0.13AT* 
-  0.12T*_2 + 0.17T*_3 + 1.27ACL* -  0.07e^_j + 0.878D^_^ 
- 0.088D^ _ 2  - 0.046D^_3 - 0.0024D^_4. 
2) TDJ = -  0.00029(i+ 0.0033(rgay Y^) + O.OBY^ -  0.0016(N^P^) 
+ 0.87TDJ_^. 
3) DlJ = - IBD'J - Floaty + FD^. 
4) TD^ = S^D1*J -  DG^. 
5) S^Di; E St X 01%. 
6) i^Yt E i t  X Yt 
The endogenous variables in the above system are D^, TD^, i^, (i^Y^), 
m m * * * * 
Dl^, (S^Dl^). The exogenous variables are d^, UR^, AT^, ACL^, 
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^t-2' ^t '  180^, Floaty, FD^, DG^, S^ 
^t-r Dt-1' ^t-Z' Dt-3' ^t-4' TD^.i ( lagged endogenous variables) 
UR^_1, T^_2 (lagged exogenous variables) 
The above system of simultaneous equations is nonlinear in some of 
i ts variables. The use of the reduced form approach for the simulation 
purpose is not feasible. For a l inear system, the matrix for the re­
duced form coefficients consists of constant elements. 
W = B'^X 
where 
W = A matrix for endogenous variable; 
X = A matrix for predetermined variables 
B~^= A matrix for constant reduced form coefficients. 
Some of the elements of the matrix analogous to B~^ in the above 
system are functions of the elements in W. Therefore, i t  is not feasible 
to f ind an explicit functional form for the endogenous variables. Be­
cause of the above problem, the system is simulated using the Gauss-
Seidel algorithm. By using this technique, the starting values for the 
endogenous variables are iterated for the solution of the system of equa­
t ions for the f irst week. The estimated values of the variables from 
the f irst week are taken as the starting values and iterated for the solu­
t ion of the system of equations for the second week, and so on. A period 
of one year from July, 1975, is undertaken for simulation. The entire 
period of 339 weekly observations is not uti l ized because of the l imited 
capacity of the available Gauss-Seidel program. The values of some 
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variables are too large, hence, al l  variables except are scaled by 
and the variable are scaled by J^QQQQ. The coefficient for 
the variable (i^Y^) in equation (2) of the above system is multipl ied by 
100. 
To measure the accuracy of the forecast ,  the Theil 's Inequality 
Coefficient U (or U statistic (RFORM)) is uti l ized. 
vÇT" + 
where 
0) = the acuta! value for the endogenous variable 
to = the forecasted value for the endogenous variable. 
U statistic approximately measures the average percent error of forecast. 
I t  is bounded by zero and one and i ts value is equal to zero i f  forecast 
is perfect. 
The values of U statistics for the two key variables D and i  are 
shown below. 
UP = 0.299 ,  U. = 0.954 
The results show a weak abil i ty of forecasted values to follow the actual 
values. This problem is more apparent for the three month Treasury bi l l  
interest rate ( i). 
For the estimation of Model I ,  the entire period of 339 weekly ob­
servations is uti l ized. As mentioned above, however, a period of the last 
52 weeks of the period under this study is employed for simulation. There­
fore, the U statistic results, presented above, cannot be taken as an 
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adequate measure for the forecasting abil i ty of Model I  over the entire 
period of this study. Moreover, the system in Model I  includes a large 
number of lagged endogenous variables. In Gauss-Seidel simulation ap­
proach, the endogenous variables are estimated in the f irst period and 
then fed into the second period as lagged endogenous variables, and so on. 
Therefore, i f  there is any error in the f irst period forecast, i t  wil l  be 
magnified in the later periods. This problem, in part, may cause a large 
forecasting error. The forecasted values of the endogenous variable de­
viate more from their actual values in later periods. Finally, the weak 
explanatory power of i  in Model I  may have been responsible for the high 
U statistic value for variable i .  
The system of simultaneous equations under Model I I  including equa­
t ion (92-12) and corrected for autocorrelation is shown below: 
1) a d* = 440.81i* - 942.13d* + 1.75UR* - 1.66UR*_j - 0.06AT* 
- 0.35T*_2 + 0.39T*_3 + 1.18ACL* - 0.22D*_2 + 0.015D*_3 
+ 0.34CD*_2 - 0.3CD*_3 - 0.09e^_^. 
2) TD^ = - 0.00026(i^Y^) + 0.0032(rg&y Y^) + 0.028Y^ - 0.0016(N^P^) 
t  
+ 0.87TDJ_^  
3) Dl^ E - IBD'J -  Floaty + FD^ 
4) TD^ .  SjDl^ - DG^ 
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5) l ' t*t = Ù ^  "t 
6) 5^01" E S; X 01% 
7) 4Dj = Dj - Dj_j 
8) AD^ H AD^ + 0.129AD^_j 
9) I ;  = IT + 0.129IT_I 
10) D*_2 = DT_2 + 0.129D^_3 
^t-3 ~ ^^-3 0.129D^_^ 
The variables with superscripts(*) are the transformed variables for the 
autocorrelation correction, where p = -0.129 is the value used for trans­
forming the values of the variables. The above system is reduced to a 
system of six equations: 
1) 0^ = 440.SLI^ + 56.86IT_I - 942.13d* + 1.75UR* - 1.6eUR*_j -  0.06AT* 
- 0.35T*_2 + 0.39T*_3 + I .IBACL* + 0.34CD*_2 + 0.3CD*] - 0.09e^_j 
+ 0.871Dt_i -  0.091Dt_2 - CLOlSD^.g + 0.00190^,4 
2) TDJ = -0.00026(ij^) + 0.0032(rs&T Y^) + 0.0287% - 0.0016(N%P,j.) 
+ 0.87TDJ_2 
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3) D1*J = - IBD'J -  Floaty + FD^ 
4) TDJ E SJDL^ - DGJ 
5) 5(01" ,  S, X 01^ 
6) h h  ^ - h ^ h  
The endogenous and exogenous variables are the same as those l isted in 
Model I  except for two addit ional variables; 
* * 
CDt_2> which is exogenous and CD^_2, which is a lagged exogenous 
variables in Model 11. 
The system of simultaneous equations under Model I I I  including equa­
t ion (98-7) and corrected for autocorrelation is shown below: 
1) AD* = - 264i* + 225.54d* - 5.54r* - 0.13AT* + 1.45ACL* -  0.27UR*_^ 
+ 0.047T*_2 - 0.180*2 + 0.026CD*] - 0.098U*_3 - 0.04e^_^ 
2) TdJ = - 0.00029(i^Y^) + 0.0033(rg%y Y^) + 0.0297% - 0.00165(N%P%) 
+ 0.87T0J _J.  
3) Dl'J 5 - IBD'J -  Floaty + FD% 
4) TDJ = S^Dl'J -  DG% 
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6) S^Dl'J .  Sj X Dl'J 
7) 60^ 5 Dj - D^.i 
8) ADJ 5 ADJ. + 0.145ADJ_J 
9) l-; =- i^ + 0.145ij. i  
10) <-3 = Ot-3 ^ °'145Dt-4 
The variables with superscripts (*) are the transformed variables for the 
autocorrelation correction where p = - 0.145 is the value used for trans­
forming the values of the variables. 
The above system is reduced to a system of six equations 
1) = - 264i^ - 38.28it_i + 225.54d*_J -  5.54RP^ - O.ISAT* + 1.45ACL* 
- 0.27UR*_i + 0.047T*_3 + 0.026CD*] - 0.098U*_3 - 0.04e^_j 
+ 0.855D^_^ + 0.1450^2 " O.ISD^,] - 0.026D^_^ 
2) TdJ  = - 0.00029(i^Y^) + 0.0033(rg%y Y^) + 0.029Y^ - 0.00165(N^P^) 
+ 0.87TDJ_^ 
3) Dl'J = -  OBD'J -  Floaty + FD^ 
4) TD% a 5(01% - DG^ 
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5) S^Di; a S; X 01% 
6) i t^t = 1t X Yt 
Because of the problems mentioned earl ier in this part, the Gauss-
Seidel forecasting procedure is not employed for the simulation of Models 
I I  and I I I. The results presented for Model I  are for i l lustrative pur­
poses only in this dissertation, but ful l  simulation of al l  three models 
is an important area for future analysis. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Legal commercial bank reserve requirements have an important influ­
ence upon the size of the money stock and the abil i ty of the central bank 
to control i t .  Moreover, the selection of the policy variable by the Fed­
eral Reserve System has a signif icant impact on money supply determination. 
Therefore, the objectives of this study have been: (1) to present the 
money supply determination process under a lagged reserve accounting sys­
tem; (2) to develop the above objective assuming different policy variables. 
Under the LRA system, the average legal reserves which a bank must 
hold during a week are a function of the bank's average deposit l iabil i t ies 
held during the week before last. Legal reserves consist of current de­
posit balances with a Federal Reserve Bank and vault cash held two weeks 
earl ier. 
To accomplish the above objectives, three models are formulated based 
upon a profit maximizing behavioral assumption for commercial banks. Given 
their known anticipations of the demand and t ime deposits and the demand 
for commercial loans, banks try to maximize the expected level of their 
profits. The decision variables, investments or earning assets, CD l ia­
bil i t ies, and Eurodollar l iabil i t ies are optimized in the decision making 
procedure. Then, based upon these optimum values, banks adjust their 
short-term (one to two weeks) variables, namely, FFM transaction, Repo 
(RP) and Reverse (RV) transactions, and borrowings from FRB. The desired 
level of the deposit supply is derived as a result of the above optimiza­
t ion. The deposit supply variations are l inked and largely explained by 
the lagged values of the variables in the models. 
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The empirical work consists of estimation and prediction of the de­
posit supply developed in the above models. Deseasonalized, weekly, t ime 
series data, for the period of January, 1970, to July, 1976, are used for 
the estimates. Ordinary-Least-Squares and 2SLS are used to estimate the 
equations. When the disturbance terms are signif icantly serially corre­
lated, GLS approach in the context of both the single and simultaneous 
equation approach is uti l ized to correct the resulted estimations. 
In Model I ,  investment or earning assets are taken as the decision 
variable. Banks adjust their FFM transactions and borrowings from FRB 
based on the optimum values of their investments. Deposit supply is de­
rived as a function of: the policy variable (UR), other exogenous vari­
ables (ACL and AT), the lagged policy variable, lagged demand and t ime 
deposits, the three months Treasury bi l l  rate ( i), the FRB's discount win­
dow rate (d), the required reserve ratios (6 ,  T), the ratios for measur­
ing the abil i ty of the banks to forecast accurately the future values of 
the variables and to adjust for the forecast errors (nQ,nY,ng^), and a 
ratio for slow adjustment of free reserves (np). 
In Model I I ,  the decision variables are investment, CD l iabil i t ies, 
and EURO borrowings. The deposit supply derived from Model I I  under LRA 
in Part I I I  is explained by the lagged values of the CD's outstanding in 
addition to the other explanatory variables used in Model I .  In actuali­
ty, and especially within the last twenty years, l iabil i ty management in­
volving the issuance of CD's and borrowings from EURO market has come to 
be an important instrument for the bank's portfol io adjustment. There­
fore, Model I I  is able to formulate reality more accurately. 
149 
After  the mid-sixt ies ,  the kind of  instruct ions given by the FOMC for  
implementing OMO showed a narrower band for  control l ing the FFR's varia­
t ions.  Therefore,  i t  seems that  the FOMC has control led the FFR exogenous-
ly as a short-run instrumental  variable to control  the money supply path.  
Reserve aggregates played a dominant  role as short-run instrumental  vari­
ables before the mid-sixt ies;  see Stigum (37).  In Models I  and I I ,  a mea­
surement of  the aggregate banking reserves,  namely,  UR^, i s  taken as an 
exogenous and short-run instrumental  variable.  In Model  I I I ,  the FFR is  
considered as the short-run instrumental  variable used by FOMC, exogenous-
ly,  to control  the money supply.  RP and RV t ransactions are ut i l ized as 
short- term (one to two weeks)  decision variables by banks in Model  I I I .  
Based on the optimum values of  the decision variables,  investment,  CD, and 
EURO borrowing,  banks adjust  their  FFM t ransactions,  borrowing from FRB, 
and RP or  RV t ransactions.  The deposi t  supply derived from Model I II  is  a 
function of  the policy variable (FFR),  in  contrast  to (UR),  and other  ex­
planatory variables used in Model  I .  
Empirical  results  from Models I  and II  indicate that  the variat ion of  
the change in the deposi t  supply is  signif icantly explained by the policy 
variable UR and the change in the nonbank-public 's  demand for  commercial  
loans (ACL).  This  result  supports  the hypothesis  that  banks accommodate 
the increase in the demand for  commercial  loans in the short-run.  In 
other  words,  the supply of  commercial  loans is  demand determined.  
The term ACL a lso plays a s ignif icant  role in Model I II  because of  
the above reasons.  The policy variable FFR has no s ignif icant  power in 
explaining the change in deposi t  supply in Model  I II ,  The high correla­
t ion among the policy variable FFR and other  interest  rates might  be 
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responsible for  causing this  problem. Results  from the models  show a  s ig­
nif icant  degree of  explanatory power for  the lagged deposits  D, T,  and CD. 
This  supports  the idea that  under the LRA system, the past  act ivi t ies  of 
the banks play an important  role in their  current  and future decision mak­
ing processes.  
The rate  of  return on earning assets  ( i )  for  the representat ive banks 
in al l  models  consists  of  only the monetary interest  rate.  As emphasized 
in the current  l i terature (4,  16,  29),  the expectat ions of  the future 
rates of  return play an important  role in the bank's  decision making proc­
ess.  Moreover,  the explici t  monetary discount  rate (d) ,  as  a measure of  
the opportunity cost  of  not  borrowing from the FR8, is  subject  to serious 
cri t icism (13,  22,  30,  37).  In the est imations for  AD in al l  models ,  the 
explanatory power for  i  and d is  not  s ignif icant .  This  suggests  that  the 
expected interest  rates and the subject ive rates for  measuring the t rue 
opportunity cost  of  not  borrowing from the FRB are absent  as  the explana­
tory variables in the est imation.  Inclusion of  these variables in the 
decision making process of  the bank could be a  subject  for  future study.  
This ,  in turn,  may solve the problem of  mult icolineari ty of  the policy 
variable FFR and other  rate of  return observed in Model I I I .  
The issuance of  CD's and/or  borrowings from EURO market ,  as  an instru­
ment for  the bank's  portfol io adjustment,  has been considered in Models I I  
and I II ,  to explain more accurately the observed facts .  As seen in Models 
I I  and III  under LRA, the current  changes in CD and U have no effect  on 
AD. The manner in which CD and U are integrated in the models  channels  
the effects  of  the changes in CD and U upon AD through the changes in the 
bank's  reserves.  Therefore,  CD and U can only affect  AD af ter  two weeks.  
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The s igns for  the coefficients  of  ^ '^t-3 '  ^ t-2 '  ^t-3 es­
t imates of  AD from the empirical  work contradict  the theoret ical  results .  
This  suggests  that  there are addit ional  direct  effects  by the current  and 
lagged CD's and U's  on AD which are not  undertaken by the models .  More 
complete analyses of  the CD and U markets  and of  the way that  CD and U 
l iabi l i t ies  are integrated in the decision making process by the banks may 
solve the above problems.  
Although the correct ion for  autocorrelat ion improved the regression 
results  in al l  est imations,  the explanatory powers and the direct ion of 
the effects  of  the variables on AD remained the same. The est imate of  AD 
within the context  of  the simultaneous equation approach changed the ex­
planatory power and the sign of  the coefficient  of  the market  interest  
rate ( i ) .  These changes,  however,  did not  confirm the theoret ical  results .  
The functional  form of  the demand for  demand deposi t  function is  not  
analyzed in this  study.  That  may be another reason for  the above behavior.  
On empirical  grounds,  the fol lowing areas for  further  research and 
analysis  are suggested.  First ,  a  comprehensive analysis  of  the demand de­
posi t  demand equation should be undertaken.  Second,  t rends and f luctua­
t ions in the f inancial  t ime series data should be analyzed by using avail­
able techniques such as spectral  analysis  and the Box-Jenkins method.  
These techniques could optimize the procedure for  deseasonalizing the 
t ime series data.  Third,  OLS and 2SLS are ut i l ized for  est imating the 
models .  Limited information maximum l ikel ihood technique and three-stage-
least-square may be employed to improve est imations.  Fourth,  the Gauss-
Seidel  algori thm for  a period of  one year  from July,  1975,  to July,  1976,  
is  ut i l ized for  simulat ion of  Model  I .  The ent ire  period of  est imation 
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undertaken by this  study is  not  employed for  simulat ion purposes because 
of  the capacity constrained for  the available Gauss-Seidel  program. The 
increase of  the capacity of  the above program to simulate the models  for  
the entire  period of  this  study can be a  subject  for  future study.  Fif th,  
weekly t ime series data have been used for  the period January,  1970,  to 
July,  1976.  As data become available,  this  study can be updated to the 
current  t ime period.  
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APPENDIX I ;  FEDERAL FUND MARKET 
Federal  Fund Market  under the Aggregate 
Reserves Instruments 
According to the assumptions concerning behavior considered in Chap­
ter  III ,  the banks with posi t ive free reserves have surplus and no borrow­
ing,  and the banks with negative free reserves have borrowing and no sur­
plus.  In the aggregate,  i f  FR > 0 ,  i t  means that  a larger  number of  the 
banks have surplus or  the larger  banks have surplus.  If  FR < 0 ,  then a 
larger  number of  the banks have borrowing or  the larger  banks have borrow­
ing.  If  FR = 0 ,  i t  means that  some banks carry surplus and some borrow­
ings,  but  in the aggregate,  the surplus is  equal  to the borrowing.  
FR = S-B* (1) 
On the average,  as  FR increases,  i t  is  expected that  there are more banks 
with surplus and fewer banks with borrowing in the system. S is  expected 
to increase and B* in absolute value is  expected to decrease.  Moreover,  
as  FR increases,  the increase in S is  l imited to the value of  FR and the 
decrease in the absolute value of  B* is  l imited to zero.  On the other  
hand,  as  FR decreases,  S would fal l  to a l imited value equal  to zero and 
the absolute value of  B* would r ise to the l imited value equal  to FR. I t  
is  known that :  
In real i ty,  other  factors  might  disturb these relat ionships.  For example,  
the FFM t ransactions might  r ise at  the t ime that  FR increases.  This  would 
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result  in an increase of  S even greater  than the increase in FR or ,  in 
other  words.  
On the average,  the above relat ionships are val id in the banking system. 
Under LRA, given RR^, the level  of  FR^ in the banking system is  de­
termined by the policy variable UR^. Any change in UR^ would result  in 
a change in FR^ by the same amount in the same direct ion.  So,  under the 
LRA system: 
SF '  S(URT)' 0£|^=S'<1, (2) 
* * . 
* 
SB. 
Bt '  B (URt).  (3)  
On the other  hand,  s ince UR^ is  used as  a control  variable,  FFR would be 
determined endogenously in the FFM without  outside or  exogenous con­
straints .  The rate for  the cost  of  the borrowing r ,  in this  case,  can be 
approximated by the FFR, which is  the most  important  component  in deter­
mining the cost  of  the borrowing.  Therefore,  r  is  defined as FFR. 
Defining FFL as  the supply of  funds in the FFM shows that  from the 
balance sheet  of  the banking system, 
FFL^ = S^-ER^, (4)  
where ER^ = excess reserves in the banking system. ER^ depends upon the 
value of  surplus in the banking system and the rate for  the cost  of  bor­
rowing,  or  FFR or  r .  Therefore:  
ER t  = n(S,r)  (5)  
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where 
and 
aER 
° -  ~Â^ = 1 
9ER. 
= < 0.  SR. T 
Since 
where 
= S(UR^),  ER^ = E(UR^,r^)  
3ER. 
° -  8DR7 ^ ERUR = N^'S' < 1. 
Then,  
where 
FFL^ = S^-E(UR^-R^) = LFUR^.R^) (6) 
3FFL. 
° -  8UR^ ^UR ^ S' (L-TIG) 1 1 
3FFL. 
~9^ = LY, = -N, 1 0. 
Defining FFB as  the demand for  funds in the FFM, from the balance 
sheet  of  the banking system, i t  fol lows:  
FFB^ = (7)  
where = borrowed reserves of  the banking system from the FRB's discount  
window. B^ depends upon the value of  total  borrowing in the banking sys­
tem, r ,  and the FRB's discount  rate d^.  Thus:  
C8) 
where 
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3B. 
0 = 
98^ 
< 1, 
and 
Since 
then.  
or  
where 
9B 
t  _ <  0 ,  
9B 
t  _ 8_ > 0 .  
ar^ r  
B* = B*(UR^),  
BT = 8 B*(UR^).  d^,  r^]  
BT = B(UR^.R^,D^) 
8B 
-  AUR^ "  ^UR^ "B *.B < 0 
93 
8?-= BP = GP 1 0 
Then,  
or  
where 
3B 
t  = B,  = 8 ,  < 0 .  SD^- °D -  "D -
FFB^ = B^-B(UR^,D^,R^) 
FFB^ = B(UR^,D^,R^), 
3FFB, 
1 I  ° "UR ° ® 
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3FFB. 
—977 "  ^  " "®R -  0' 
3FFB 
t  _ 
= bJ = -0 .  > 0. 
3d^ d d — 
For the equil ibrium in the FFM, i t  can be s tated that :  
FFL^ = FFB^ (10) 
or 
L(UR^,R^) = B([JR^,D^,R^). 
I t  is  then found that  FFR is  a function of  UR^ and d^;  
R^ = R(UR^,D^) (11) 
where 
= R„. -  & < 0. AUR; "UR LP-BP 
i a ;  =  " d  =  l t b ;  >  
The rate of  return on the holding surplus r  can be expressed as  
H 
fol  1ows:  
c^ = the transaction cost  of  t ransferr ing funds to the FFM and i t  is  
reasonable to assume r^ = 0;^ thus:  
"T 
^Decreases in real  interest  rates due to inflat ion are not  taken into 
account .  
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FFLT 
For the purpose of  approximation,  s ince real is t ical ly,  is  quite  small  
FFLT 
t  = 1 ,  so 
^T 
= ^t-Ct or, = c^. (13) 
Transaction cost  c^ is  fair ly constant .  The relat ionships above show the 
difference between the rate of  the cost  of  borrowing and the rate of  re­
turn on the holding surplus.  This  difference can be approximated by a  
constant  term. From the theoret ical  work in Chapter  I II ,  the desired value 
for  the anticipated level  of  the free reserves is ;  
therefore,  i t  can be wri t ten:  
Fpf = _H fl_ j oy, F^=f(i^-r^), (14) 
where 
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From Chapter  I II ,  i t  is  known that  the functional  form H exhibi ts  the 
same propert ies  as  G~j.  G"j  is  the functional  form for  desired levels  of  
the anticipated free reserves for  individual  bank J .  I t  can then be 
s tated 
> 0 .  
From SOC of  profi t  maximization from Chapter  I II ,  i t  is  restated r-r^ > 0 .  
Thus,  
AFR* 
3 I ^ =  F I  <  0  
9FR. 
-8?; = FR = -  FI > 0' 
Or, in other  words:  
3FRT 
since 
then 
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Alternatively,  the desired level  of  the anticipated free reserves can be 
wri t ten:  
FR^ = n( i^,r^) ,  where < 0 ,  and > 0 .  (15) 
The surplus and the borrowing of  the banking system can be assumed 
to be a  function of  the free reserves.  By s imilar  calculat ions,  the 
functional  form R can al ternat ively be shown as:  
- . a .  
r  = R*(FRt,dt)  (16) 
where 
gFR^ PR |_a _ 
r  r  
' "T ' I  
the superscript  "a" indicates the al ternat ive functional  forms.  
Federal  Fund Market  under a  
Federal  Fund Rate Instrument 
In this  part ,  the FOMC uses FFR as  a short-run control  variable so 
FFR is  exogenously constrainted and determined.  The cost  of  borrowing 
is  determined endogenously by short-run market  forces.  Therefore,  the 
rate cost  of  borrowing cannot  be approximated by the FFR. Both UR^ and 
FR^ are endogenously determined in the system. Under LRA and with the 
same behavioral  assumptions as  seen in the preceding sect ion of  this  ap­
pendix for  the banking system as a whole,  the fol lowing relat ionship can 
be s tated.  
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<  =  b * ( f r ^ )  
h = S{FR^) 
(18) 
(17) 
where 
ST = ERT+FFLT+RVT (19) 
< = BT+FFBT+RPF (20) 
RP^ = Repurchase agreement outstanding at  t ime t .  
RV^ = Reverse repurchase agreement outstanding at  t imet .  
Equations (19) and (20) denote that  the surplus can al ternat ively be 
al located to ER^, FFL^, ,  and/or  RV^, and the borrowing funds can be pro-
I t  can be s tated that :  
ER^ = nl(S^,rp,r j^)  where rp = FFR 
and rj^ = overnight  interest  rate in RP (or  
RV) market .  
The excess reserves in the banking system are a function of  total  surplus 
in the system, FFR, and the overnight  interest  rate on RP (or  RV),  
= S(FR^);  thus.  
* 
vided as B^,  FFB^, and/or  RP^.  
ER^ = ER(FR^,rp,r[^) ,  where (21) 
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Furthermore,  RV^ = n2(S^,rp,r |^) .  
The reverse repurchase agreement in the banking system is  a function of  
total  surplus in the system, FFR and i ts  own market  interest  rate.  
Then 
R V t  =  R V ( F R ^ , r p , r p )  ( 2 2 )  
where 
3RV. 3RV. 9RV. 
and -^>0.  
On the other  hand,  on the borrowing s ide i t  can be wri t ten 
— 01(B^JD,RP,R^). 
Borrowing from the FRB's discount  window is  a function of  the total  
amount of  borrowing in the system, the FRB's discount  rate,  FFR, and RP 
or  RV market  interest  rate.  
*  * ,  B = B (FR^).  
Therefore,  
= B(FR^,D,RP.RF^), (.23) 
where 
3B. 38.  3B. 9B, 
2  0.  and ^>0.  
It  can also be wri t ten 
RP^ = 82(BT,RP,R^). 
Hence,  
RPT = RP(FR^,RP,RP), (24) 
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where 
9RP. 9RP. 3RP. 
11 ÂFR; 1 0. 
The supply of  funds in the FFM can be wri t ten as;  
FFL^ = S(FR^)-ER(FR^,RP,RR)-RV(FR^.RP,RR), 
or 
where 
FFL^ = Ll(FR^,rp,  Vr ) ,  
9FFL. 
0 1 BFR^ 
= as  
3FRt 
arp 
3ER^ 
3 r p -
3RV. 
i  0. 
3ER^ 5RV^ 
(25) 
In actual i ty,  the larger  response from reverse repurchase t ransaction to 
a change in i ts  own interest  rate is  expected over the response from 
excess reserves.  Therefore,  i t  fol lows 
3FFL. 
^ < 0. 
" • r  
The demand for  funds in the FFM can be s tated as:  
*  
or 
FFB^ = B (FR^)-B(,FR^,d,rp,rR)-RPCFR^,rp,rR) 
FFB^ = BL(FR^,RP,RR,D) ,  (26) 
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where 
- 3FR^ "  9FR^ * 
9B. 3RP. 
- L - - ^ L  1 ° .  
SB^ 
3FFBJ 
ARR-
3B^ 9RP^ 
9RR S R F -
<  0 ,  
3FFB^ 3B^ 
3d 
3FFB. 
3d > 0 
3r R 
Realis t ical ly,  
2!T 
'  " • r  
3RP 
3RR 9^R 
thus.  
8FFB, 
^^R -
> 0 .  
The equil ibrium condit ion in the FFM can be wri t ten as:  
FFL^ = FFB^, or  Ll(FR^^rp,r%)-bl(FR^,rp,rQ,d) 
Then,  
where 
FR^ = FR(RP,D,R,^), 
3FR, 3FR, 
<  0 ,  3d -> 0, 
(27) 
(28) 
3FR, 
-
>  0 .  
Both the rate of  cost  for  borrowing r  and the rate of  return on hold­
ing surplus r^ are endogenously determined in the system and are approxi­
mated as  
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B. FFB. RP, 
r - d ' — + (fr-C, ) —*- + Crn-Cp) —* , (29) 
BT BT BT 
ER_ FFL. RV. 
+  ( r f-C}) ~S^ '  (^0) 
and Cg are transaction costs  of  t ransforming funds to the FFM and RP 
market  respectively.  From the optimization process for  the banking sys­
tem i t  is  understood that  
W) " FR = -  H \zr~] = -  HI 1  -
By subst i tut ing for  r  and r^,  the results  can be shown as  
FR* = - H^(i,rp,r(^,d,FR). 
Since 
FR = FR(rp,d,r%) ,  
then,  
FR* = Ol(i , rp,r%,d) .  (31) 
In real i ty,  i t  is  expected that  
# 1 0 .  ^ > 0 .  g - ^ 0 ,  a n d  
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APPENDIX I I :  DATA 
Time Period under Study 
The t ime period undertaken by this  study is  from the f i rs t  week of  
January,  1970,  to the last  week of  June,  1976.  Three-hundred thir ty-nine 
(339) observations of  weekly data are used for  the empirical  work within 
the above t ime expand.  
The reasons for  choosing the above t ime period are:  
1)  The models  in Chapter  I II  best  explain the behavior of  banks and Fed 
(or  FOMC) during the decade of  the Seventies.  
2)  Lack of  available weekly data on essential  variables af ter  June of  
1976.  
The models  in Chapter  I II  formulate the short-run banking decisions which 
a t  best  can be considered as  weekly decisions.  Therefore,  using weekly 
data is  crucial .  
Data Directory 
Unless specif ied,  a l l  data are weekly averages,  not  seasonally ad­
justed f igures,  and measured in terms of  mil l ions of  dollars ,  with the ex­
ception of  interest  rates and rat ios.  
Variables:  
i  Treasury bi l l  interest  rate -  the rate which 99-day Treasury 
bi l ls  are discounted in the open money market .  
d Discount  rate  -  the rate at  which the New York FRB wil l  redis­
count  el igible paper of  member banks and advances on promissory 
notes secured ei ther  by such el igible paper or  by USGS's.  
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Composite  interest  rate on t ime and savings deposi ts  -  this  
series is  interpolated from monthly r^^y series.  
Federal  funds interest  rate -  the rate a t  which excess reserves 
on deposi t  with Fed are traded by member banks.  
Unborrowed reserves -  the total  reserves of  member banks minus 
borrowings from FRB's discount  window. 
Required reserves.  
Free reserves.  
Time and savings deposi ts  a t  member banks -  consist  of  a l l  t ime 
and savings deposi ts  a t  member banks minus al l  CD's issued by 
weekly report ing commercial  banks in denominations of  $100,000 
or  more.  
Cert if icates of  deposi t  (CD) -  negotiable t ime cert i f icates 
of  deposi t  issued in denominations of  $100,000 or  more by large,  
weekly-report ing commercial  banks.  
The demand component  of  the money s tock -  the demand deposi ts  
a t  al l  commercial  banks other  than those due to domestic  com­
mercial  banks and the United States Government,  less  cash i tems 
in the process of  col lect ion and FRB's Float .  
Government demand deposi ts  a t  commercial  banks -  the sum of  
demand balances of  the United States Government a t  commercial  
banks.  
Government demand deposi t  a t  member banks -  the sum of  demand 
balances of  the United States Government a t  member banks.  
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o d d ' "  other demand deposi ts  a t  member banks -  gross demand deposi ts  
a t  member banks minus the sum of  demand deposi ts  due to banks 
and the United States Government demand deposi ts  a t  member banks.  
FD Foreign deposi ts  a t  FRB's.  
Due to"^ Due to  member banks -  demand deposi ts  due to member banks that  
are reported by commercial  banks in the United States.  
Due from"'  Due from banks a t  member banks -  demand deposi ts  due from com­
mercial  banks in the United States that  are reported by member 
banks.  
CIPC"^ Cash i tems in the process of  col lect ion at  member banks -  the 
amounts that  member banks have credited to depositors '  accounts 
but  have not  yet  collected from the banks on which the deposited 
checks were drawn. 
Float  Float  -  reserve credit  given for  checks not  yet  collected.  I t  
represents  cash i tems in the process of  col lect ion at  FRB's 
less  the sum of  deferred availabil i ty cash i tems and al l  col­
lected funds due other  reserve banks which have not  yet  been re-
mi t ted.  
CL Commercial  loans -  al l  commercial  and industr ial  loans lent  by 
large commercial  weekly-report ing banks,  which account  for  90% 
of  a l l  commercial  and industr ial  loans lent  by weekly-report ing 
banks.  This  i tem is  a Wednesday f igure.  
Y Gross nat ional  product  (GNP) -  the current  dollar  value of  gross 
nat ional  product ,  seasonally adjusted quarterly data.  Variable 
Y i s  redefined as a weekly average data by l inear  interpolat ion 
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of quarterly t ime series data.  The method for  interpolat ion is  
as fol lows:  
Given the values for  two subsequent  quarters  Yg and Y^g,  the 
l inear  equation is  wri t ten as 
YIQ-YN YI--YN 
^ "  13-0 ^ " 13-0 (13) + Y^G. 
Plugging the values of  X = 1 ,  2,  3 ,  13 in the above equa­
t ion,  the subsequent  weekly average values for  Y (namely Y^,  Yg,  
Yg,  . . . ,  Y^g) are derived.  Similarly for  the other  quarters  for  
X = 14,  . . .  the values for  Y^^ . . .  are derived which results  in 
the different  equations for  different  quarters .  
GNP price deflator ,  base year  = 1972,  seasonally adjusted,  
quarterly data.  The variable P is  redefined as weekly average 
data by l inear  interpolat ion of quarterly t ime series data.  
The above method is  used for  interpolat ion.  
Populat ion,  quarterly data,  the variable N i s  redefined as a 
weekly average data by l inear  interpolat ion of  quarterly t ime 
series data.  The above method is  used for  interpolat ion.  N 
i s  measured in terms of  one person.  
Eurodollar  borrowings -  gross l iabi l i t ies  of  banks to their  
foreign branches by large,  weekly-report ing commercial  banks.  
Required reserves against  net  demand deposi ts .  
Required reserves against  total  t ime and savings -  the required 
reserves against  savings and t ime deposits  and total  CD l iabi l i ­
t ies .  
Required reserves against  EURO ' S .  
174 
Derived variables;  
NP Reverse of  per  capita  index,  
NP = N X P.  
IBD^ Intermember bank deposi ts .  
IBD^ = Due to '^-Due from"^.  
D Net  demand deposi ts  a t  member bank where 
D = DDA'"+DG'"+IBD'" 
DDA*^ = GDD^-DG^ -  Due to '"  -  CIPC'",  therefore,  
D = GDD"^-Due from'"-CPIc '^,  where 
GOD*" = gross demand deposi ts  a t  books of  member banks.  
DDA*" = demand deposi ts  adjusted a t  member banks.  
I t  is  defined;  
o d d"" = GDD'"-Due to '^-DG"^; thus,  
D = OOD^+DG^+IBO^^CIPC^. 
Dl"* Total  member bank deposi ts  by nonbank-publ  ic  and by the United 
States Government -  the sum of  (1)  the gross demand deposi ts  a t  
al l  member banks other  than those due to member banks that  are 
reported by commercial  banks in the United States,  less  cash 
i tems in process of  col lect ion and FRBS'  Float ;  and (2)  foreign 
demand balances a t  FRB. 
Dl"^ = GDD^-Due to '"-CIPc' " -Float+FD, or  
01^ = D -  IBD'^-Float+FD, or  
Dl '"  = ODD^+DG^-CIPC^-Float+FD. 
S Blow up factor  -  the rat io of  total  deposi ts  by the nonbank-
publ  ic  and the United States Government in the commercial  banks 
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to total  deposi t  of  the nonbank-public and the United States 
Government in the member banks.  
5 = TPD+DG .  
o f  
Required reserve rat io against  net  demand deposi t  
RR 
6 = n under LRA. 
"T-2 
Required reserve rat io against  t ime deposi t .  
RR, 
T = ?— under LRA. 
' t -2 
Required reserve rat io against  CD. 
Y = T^K under LRA. 
^ ^ t - 2  
Required reserve rat io against  U. 
RR 
w = n under LRA. 
^T-2 
Composite  required reserve rat io against  T and CD. 
t1  = T t rn under LRA. 
'T-2^^T-2 
Reserve release 
R L  =  -  [ A Ô  • + A tI  •  ( T ^ g + C D ^ g )  +  A w  •  U^^^].  
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Data Sources 
1.  Quarterly data on Y and P in terms of  current  values are obtained from 
Survey of  Current  Business.  
2.  Quarterly data on N are obtained from Economic Report  of  the President .  
3.  Weekly data on U are obtained from the Federal  Reserve Bullet in.  
4.  Weekly data on a l l  remainder variables are obtained from the Board 
of  Governors of  the Federal  Reserve Banks.  
